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Litigation over the Contraception Mandate—which
requires all employer insurance plans to include coverage for
contraceptives—is quickly becoming one of the largest
religious liberty challenges in American history. The most
powerful claim raised by some of the litigants is that their
status as “religious institutions” exempt them from compliance
with the Mandate. But what is a religious institution, and who
gets to become one—and why? Should the University of Notre
Dame be treated the same as the Archdiocese of the District of
Columbia? Should lobbying group Priests for Life be lumped
together with Hobby Lobby, a for-profit corporation? Neither
commentators nor courts have considered how to assess which
of these types of groups—religious universities, religious
interest
groups,
or
religiously-based
for-profit
corporations—should be labeled as a religious institution, free
to ignore the Mandate with no governmental recourse, and
which groups should not be categorized as such.
This Article carefully disaggregates the nature of the
challengers to the Contraception Mandate and the distinct
causes of action pleaded by those challengers. Drawing on
earlier work that establishes a unique framework for
identifying constitutional religious institutions, this Article
applies that framework to the various classes of litigants
challenging the Contraception Mandate. The framework
captures the subset of institutions which, if empowered with
rights beyond those granted in the generally applicable
Religion Clauses, will most often and effectively use those
rights to benefit society as a whole. The goal of this Article,
*
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therefore, is to provide an application of this framework for
identifying constitutional religious institutions to the
institutional claimants in the Contraception Mandate litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Few people noticed when a motley group of institutions first made
claims that their religious liberty had been violated by the Obama
Administration’s “Contraception Mandate.”1 But the number of
Contraception Mandate challengers quickly grew, creating one of the
largest religious liberty challenges in American history and triggering an
equally outsized explosion of scholarly and popular commentary.2
1.
The Affordable Care Act requires that large employers provide health care
insurance that offers basic preventive care—including FDA-approved contraception—at
no cost to employees. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A (2014). For comprehensive and
up-to-date information on the contraception mandate litigation, see HHS Mandate
Information Central, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/
hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (providing information and updates
on the religious liberty challenges to the Contraception Mandate).
2.
See, e.g., Lines Crossed: Separation of Church and State. Has the Obama
Administration Trampled on Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Conscience? Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 48–51 (2012)
(statement of C. Ben Mitchell, Professor of Moral Philosophy and Southern Baptist
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For some commentators, the Mandate challenges are empowering,
representing the essence of American religious liberty.3 For others, the
litigation is infuriating, an example of the powerful Christian majority
asserting their dominance over the liberties of others.4 What is surprising
about existing commentary, however, is not the broad disagreement over
the proper scope of religious liberty, but rather that commentators have
failed to adequately disaggregate both the claimants and the various
claims of unlawfulness made by those claimants. While scholars and
popular commentators alike make statements about corporate religious
liberty,5 the high level of generalization masks numerous and legally
Minister) (“The policy is an unconscionable intrusion by the State into the consciences of
American citizens. . . . [t]his is not only a Catholic issue . . . . [n]ot just a Baptist issue; it
is an American issue, enshrined in our founding documents.”); see also id. at 59
(statement of Craig Mitchell, Professor of Christian Ethics and Baptist Minister) (“[The
Contraception Mandate] is wrong because it violates the Constitution. It is wrong because
it violates religious liberty. It is wrong because it forces people to violate their
consciences. . . . This ruling is just plain wrong for America.”); Letter from Anthony R.
Picarello & Michael F. Moses, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, to Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dept. of Health & Human Servs.
(Mar. 20, 2013), available at http://www.usccb.org/about/general-counsel/rulemaking/
upload/2013-NPRM-Comments-3-20-final.pdf; Timothy Dolan, HHS Contraception
Mandate Un-American, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/
forum/story/2012-01-25/dolan-hhs-health-contraceptive-mandate/52788780/1
(last
visited Sept. 7, 2014).
3.
See, e.g., Jeremy M. Christiansen, “The Word Person . . . Includes
Corporations”: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Protects Both For- and
Non-Profit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 623; Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked
Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Colombo, Naked Private
Square]; Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS
Mandate, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 589 (2014); Michael A. Helfand, What is a “Church”?:
Implied Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401
(2013); Andrew B. Kartchner, Corporate Free Exercise: A Survey of Supreme Court
Cases Applied to a Novel Question, 6 Regent J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 85 (2014); Mark L.
Rienzi, God and Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Money-Makers?, 21 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 59 (2013); Jonathan T. Tan, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporation,
and the HHS Mandate: Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA’s Requirements, 47 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1301 (2013); Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free
Exercise Rights, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 369 (2013).
4.
See, e.g., James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1565, 1575 (2013); Thomas E. Rutledge, A Corporation Has No Soul—The
Business Entity Response to Challenges to the Contraception Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2014); Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of
Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 342 (2014); Caroline
Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, (Univ. of Miami Law Sch., Working Paper),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384963&download=
yes.
5.
See, e.g., Moran Cerf, Aziz Huq & Avital Mentovich, Do Americans Think
Corporations
Have
the
Right
to
Religious
Freedom?,
SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/do_americans_
think_corporations_have_the_right_to_religious_freedom.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).

752

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

distinct constitutional and statutory challenges that apply disparately
depending on the institutional nature of the claimants involved.
The importance of disaggregating both the Mandate challengers and
the various causes of action stated by those challengers cannot be
understated. For one class of litigants, the core issue is whether they are
protected by the leading religious freedom statute, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)6—in essence a question of statutory
interpretation, albeit against the backdrop of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses.7 For another class of litigants, the critical cause of
action is whether they are “persons” for the purposes of the First
Amendment Religion Clause—a question of constitutional
interpretation—thereby entitled to hold the rights protected therein.8 If
successful, these claims potentially entitle the litigants to judicial
balancing of their religious interest vis-à-vis the government’s interest as
stipulated in the Contraception Mandate.9
The importance of disaggregating the litigants and claims, however,
becomes most apparent in the context of those Mandate challengers that
make the claim that they are constitutional religious institutions.10 This

6.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2011).
7.
See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120–21,
1134–35 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (holding that for-profit
corporations may bring a claim pursuant to the First Amendment Religion Clauses); infra
notes 93–96 and accompanying text (discussing the contours of a RFRA claim).
8.
See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013)
(holding that “a for-profit, secular corporation cannot assert a claim under the Free
Exercise Clause”).
9.
See § 2000bb-1(b) (“Government may substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.”). The constitutional
situation is more complicated, and the Court will only apply a strong balancing test in
certain contexts. For an explanation of the constitutional standards under the Free
Exercise Clause, see infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text (discussing the structure
of the First Amendment Religion Clauses).
10.
See infra notes 109–16 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s new
religious institutionalism). See generally Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth v.
Sebelius, No. 4:12-CV-00314, 2013 WL 9600145 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2013); Franciscan
Univ. of Steubenville v. Sebelius, No. 2:12-CV-440, 2013 WL 1189854 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
22, 2013); Roman Catholic Diocese of Dall. v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 406 (N.D. Tex.
2013); Conlon v. Sebelius, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Archdiocese of St.
Louis v. Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2013); Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Washington v. Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2013); Persico v. Sebelius, 919 F.
Supp. 2d 622 (W.D. Pa. 2013); Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend v. Sebelius, 988 F.
Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Ind. 2013); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM,
2012 WL 6756332 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012); Catholic Diocese of Biloxi, Inc. v.
Sebelius, No. 1:12CV158–HSO–RHW, 2012 WL 6831407 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 20, 2012);
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cause of action, pleaded by some, but not all, of the institutional
challengers, claims that the institution is entitled to special constitutional
solicitude and potentially absolute constitutional protection from the
government’s attempt to force provision of contraceptives and
abortifacents.11 That is, once a claimant can demonstrate it is a
constitutional religious institution and that the conduct engaged in is
protected by the First Amendment, no balancing is required—the
conduct is absolutely protected.12
This aspect of the challenges to the Contraception Mandate has
gone unnoticed by commentators and has been largely ignored by the
courts.13 One of the primary reasons for this failure to consider the
unique constitutional argument is that it is a relatively new cause of

Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y.
2012); Zubik v. Sebelius, 911 F. Supp. 2d 314 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
11.
See infra notes 84–87 (describing the religious institutionalism cause of
action).
12.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C.,
132 S. Ct. 694, 705–06 (2012) (adopting a ministerial exception, precluding the
application of employment discrimination laws to “ministers” in religious institutions,
and stating that the right of religious institutions to constitutional protection is absolute);
see also Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of
Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (“[O]ne criticism of the
ministerial exception was that it was absolute, that it involved no balancing.”); Jack M.
Balkin, The “Absolute” Ministerial Exception, BALKANIZATION (Jan. 13, 2012, 8:59
AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/01/absolute-ministerial-exception.html (“One of
the curious features of the ministerial exception is that the rule is stated in absolute terms
that eschew all attempts at balancing.”).
13.
Commentators have focused on either the Free Exercise Clause claim (that
the institution’s free exercise of religion has been violated) or that RFRA has been
violated. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L.
REV. COLL. 151, 152 (2012) (arguing that the Mandate does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause or RFRA); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28
J.L. & POL. 91, 91 (2013) (examining the issues raised by government recognition of
religious claims of conscience); Andrew Koppelman, Freedom of the Church and the
Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 157–64 (2013); Holly
Fernandez Lynch, Religious Liberty, Conscience, and the Affordable Care Act, 20
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 118, 122–23 (2013) (noting that courts are split as to whether the
Mandate violates the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA); Jonathan T. Tan, Nonprofit
Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and the HHS Mandate: Why the Mandate Does
Not Satisfy RFRA’s Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1301, 1302–03 (2013); Edward
Whelan, The HHS Contraception Mandate vs. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2179, 2180–81 (2012); Steven D. Smith & Caroline Mala
Corbin, Debate, The Contraception Mandate and Religion Freedom, 161 U. PENN. L.
REV. ONLINE, 261, 261–62, 268 (2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/161-UPa-L-Rev-Online-261.pdf (debating whether the Mandate violates RFRA); The Bishops
& Religious Liberty, COMMONWEAL, https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/bishopsreligious-liberty (May 30, 2012), (untitled essays by William A. Galston, Cathleen
Kaveny, Douglas Laycock, Michael P. Moreland, Mark Silk & Peter Steinfels).
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action.14 The core reason, however, is that there remains significant
confusion in the lower federal courts about how to distinguish between
institutions that attract the mantle of a constitutional religious institution
and those that do not.15 In order to recognize unique protections for
religious institutions, courts must figure out who or what a constitutional
“religious institution” is.
The Contraception Mandate illustrates the problem. Among the
challengers to the Mandate include institutions that act in ways that
might seem religious in nature.16 One for-profit corporation might set
14.
See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705–06 (holding that there is a ministerial
exception under the First Amendment and acknowledging that, until 2012, the Supreme
Court had not considered the ministerial exception). Although, note that the lower federal
courts have recognized a “ministerial exception” in the Religion Clauses since 1972. See,
e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972) (first case
recognizing the ministerial exception); see also Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the
Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 21 (2011) (indicating that every federal circuit
and many states have adopted a form of the ministerial exception).
15.
While no court has attempted to define a constitutional religious institution,
lower courts have faced the question of what constitutes a “religious institution” in
various statutory contexts. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(iv) (2006) (defining
organizations for the purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act as
“associated with a church or a convention or association of churches” where the
organization “shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church or
convention or association of churches”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2006) (stating that Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply “to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities”); Hollins
v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–26 (6th Cir. 2007) (indicating that
Methodist Healthcare is a religious institution in part because religious institutions are not
limited to traditional organizations, but rather include other entities such as religious
schools, corporations, and hospitals); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash.,
Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 2004) (concluding “that a religiously affiliated entity is a
‘religious institution’ for purposes of the ministerial exception whenever that entity’s
mission is marked by clear or obvious religious characteristics”); Scharon v. St. Luke’s
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the
defendant is a religious institution for the purposes of Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). For limited scholarly discussions on defining a
“religious institution” in statutory contexts, see Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the
Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1539–40 (1979); Michael A. Helfand, What Is a “Church”?:
Implied Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401,
401–11 (2013) (discussing religious employer exceptions to the Affordable Care Act).
16.
See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th
Cir. 2013) (describing one corporate plaintiff as a for-profit bookstore which sells only
“Christian books and materials”); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No.
13-5018, 2013 WL 2395168 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2013) (describing the for-profit corporate
plaintiff as engaged in the publication of “Christian books ranging from Bible
commentaries to books about family issues to Christian fiction”), interlocutory appeal
dismissed, No. 13-5018, 2013 WL 2395168 (D.C. Cir. May 03, 2013).
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aside physical space and times for prayer during the work day.17 Another
might mandate that business is closed on certain days of the week in
accordance with a specific denominational belief.18 Yet another might
establish rules of service, whereby customers that, for example, are gay,
might be refused services on the basis of religion.19 Then there are the
claims of religious universities and the not-for-profit institutions—
sometimes formally associated with a denominational house of worship,
and sometimes not.20 Some of the universities might mandate religion
classes, others may not.21 Some not-for-profit groups may follow specific
dictates of a church, and others may not.22
Are they all “religious institutions”? Are only some of them? In an
earlier article, I made the case that identifying who or what is a
constitutional religious institution was a critical threshold question to
giving independent meaning to the Court’s new, exclusive right for
religious institutions.23 Guidance on this question, I claimed, is critical in
light of the absolute constitutional protection afforded those institutions
that are labeled constitutional religious institutions.24 The article
advanced the idea of institutional exceptionalism—that there exists a
17.
See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801 (E.D. Mich.,
2013) (describing how religion is built into the daily life of the corporation by, for
example, offering a daily Catholic Mass service, a Catholic bookstore, a Catholic credit
union, and food options that offer Catholic food).
18.
Id. Other examples of corporations that close for religious purposes include
Chick-fil-A. Why We’re Closed on Sundays, CHICK-FIL-A, http://www.chick-fila.com/Company/Highlights-Sunday (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (describing a Christian
rationale for closing the fast food outlets on Sundays).
19.
See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013)
(where a photography company refused to offer services to the plaintiff because of her
sexual orientation).
20.
See infra notes 63–66 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the
not-for profit and educational claimants).
21.
See, e.g., About the Liberal Studies Program, DEPAUL,
http://academics.depaul.edu/liberal-studies/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept.
18, 2014) (requiring courses in “Religious Dimensions”); Approved Courses,
MARQUETTE
UNIV.,
http://www.marquette.edu/core-of-common-studies/approvedcourses.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (requiring six credits of theology); University
Requirements, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME, http://fys.nd.edu/incoming-students/first-yearrequirements/curriculum-requirements/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (requiring two
courses in theology).
22.
See, e.g., Ave Maria Found. v. Sebelius, 991 F. Supp. 2d 957, 962 (E.D.
Mich. 2014) (“Plaintiffs are five nonprofit organizations ‘founded, organized,
and . . .maintained in conformity with and/or for furtherance of the teachings of the
Catholic Church.’”) (quoting Monaghan Decl. ¶ 28, ECF No. 3–2); see also infra notes
63–66 and accompanying text (discussing the not-for-profit challengers to the Mandate).
23.
Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181
(2014).
24.
Id. at 183, 203–04 (outlining the protection afforded to religious institutions
whose activities fall within the coverage of the institutional right).
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certain category of institutions that claim to be religious who fulfill
unique and important roles in our democracy.25 A constitutional
“religious institution” comprises a limited group of institutions that share
common attributes, most notably the valuing of individual conscience,
protection of group rights, and provision of desirable social structures.26
These values, the Supreme Court has explained, undergird those
institutions that are unique in our constitutional and societal structures.27
Drawing on the framework I established in my earlier article,28 I
examine the claims of the various challengers to the Contraception
Mandate that they are constitutional “religious institutions” entitled to
special and absolute constitutional protection from the reach of the
Mandate. The framework takes a holistic approach to identifying a
constitutional religious institution, and identifies a set of factors that
draws on the articulated values of protection of religious group rights,
valuing individual conscience, and provision of desirable social
structures. The consequent factors rely on the cues of third parties and
institutional functionality, as well as the voluntariness of the institution
in terms of entrance and exit rights as key indicators for identifying
which institutions are best fulfilling the values of constitutional religious
institutions.
I develop these ideas in three parts. Part I briefly explores the reach
of the Contraception Mandate before disaggregating the litigants into
four distinct classes: Catholic Archdiocese and other denominational
houses of worship, religious universities, for-profit corporations, and
religious lobby groups. This Part also disaggregates the various causes of
action pursued by the different litigants, first explaining the variety of
religious liberty challenges that are available to litigants, and then
outlining which litigants followed each cause of action and explaining
the importance of these litigation choices for each class of litigants.
Part II narrows the focus into one of these specific litigation
choices, namely the claim that the institutional challenger is a
constitutional religious institution. The Part considers how the courts
might answer the critical threshold question of who, or what, is a
constitutional religious institution. Drawing on an earlier article, this Part
articulates a unique framework, designed to provide guidance to courts
faced with this difficult question.

25.
Id. at 205–06 (arguing that there are certain religious institutions that fulfil a
unique and important role in our constitutional democracy).
26.
Id. at 206–24 (discussing the three constitutional values in-depth).
27.
Id. at 194–202 (outlining the Court’s cases that establish and elaborate
constitutional religious institutionalism).
28.
Id. at 224–29 (elaborating a framework based on the constitutional values
implicit in the Court’s religious institutionalism decisions).
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Part III is the core of the Article and returns to the institutional
challengers of the Contraception Mandate. This Part dovetails the
framework with the lived reality of the Mandate litigation, applying the
framework outlined in Part II to the challengers of the Mandate. In doing
so, the goal of this Part is to determine which, if any, of the Mandate
challengers have a colorable claim to the absolute constitutional
protection for religious institutions provided for in the First Amendment
Religion Clauses.
I. THE CONTRACEPTION MANDATE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The goal of this Part is to briefly address the contours of the
Contraception Mandate. To this end, Section A discusses the structure of
the Mandate. Section B delineates the classes of litigants that the
Mandate affects. Finally, Section C focuses on and disaggregates the
different claims made by the litigants outlined in Section B. By breaking
down the various causes of action pleaded by the Mandate challengers,
Section C demonstrates that the cause of action with which we should be
most concerned is the claim by some litigants to be a constitutional
religious institution. This Section highlights the unique potential of the
religious institutionalism claim and the potential power that would vest
in any designated constitutional religious institutionalism that successful
institutionalism claim would yield.
A. The Structure of the Mandate
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law.29 The ACA affected
a variety of significant changes to the healthcare system in the United
States, with the primary goal being to increase the number of Americans
covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of health care.30 As
part of that mandate, the ACA requires that all health insurance issuers
29.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. This Article refers to these laws collectively as the “ACA,”
which is the preferred term in contemporary literature. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Loopholes in the Affordable Care Act: Regulatory Gaps and Border Crossing Techniques
and How to Address Them, 5 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 27, 27 (2011). On June
28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, upheld the
ACA’s individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing power, while
striking down a portion of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as exceeding Congress’s
authority under the Spending Clause. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
30.
Fact Sheet, The Affordable Care Act: Secure Health Coverage for the
Middle Class, WHITE HOUSE (June 28, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2012/06/28/fact-sheet-affordable-care-act-secure-health-coverage-middle-class.
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and non-grandfathered group health plans that offer group or individual
coverage include coverage for certain preventive care services for
women without cost-sharing.31 The ACA stipulates that the required
preventive care coverage that health insurance issuers and group health
plans are required to provide are to be “provided for in comprehensive
guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services
Administration” (HRSA),32 a component of the Department of Health
and Human Services. 33
In order to develop recommendations for the required guidelines for
implementation of preventive health care for women, HRSA
commissioned the Institute of Medicine (IOM).34 The IOM, an
31.
See Pub. L. 111-148 § 2713, 124 Stat. 131 (Mar. 23, 2010), codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2011). The “Contraception Mandate” is distinct from the ACA’s
“individual mandate” (which taxes most individuals who do not purchase health
insurance) and the “employer mandate” (which taxes employers with more than fifty
employees that do not provide group health insurance to their employees). See Frederick
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
343, 344, 350 n.26 (2014) (“Cost sharing is defined by the Department of Health and
Human Services as “any contribution consumers make towards the cost of their
healthcare.”); Brief for Church-State Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2387895.
32.
§ 300gg-13(a)(4). Section 2713 included within the definition of preventive
healthcare services “such additional preventive care and screenings” not otherwise
covered, “as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration.” Id. HRSA subsequently adopted women’s
coverage guidelines which included “contraceptive methods and counseling,” defined as
“[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive
capacity.” Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines,
HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last
visited Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter HRSA Coverage Guidelines]. These Guidelines were
adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services on July 2, 2013. 45 eC.F.R.
§ 147.130(a)(i)(iv)(A); see Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act: Final Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 39869, 39870–72 (July 2, 2013) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510 & 2590 & 45 C.F.R. pts. 147 & 156).
This Article cites to the final Mandate rules, as codified by the U.S. Government Printing
Office for the Department of Health and Human Services. 45 eC.F.R. §§ 147.130–31
(Sept.
12,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=7b1c7a85b492b6025ef3085f499b0434&node=pt45.1.147&rgn=div5.
33.
About HRSA, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.
gov/about/index.html (“The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), an
agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is the primary Federal
agency for improving access to health care by strengthening the health care workforce,
building healthy communities and achieving health equity.”).
34.
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE
SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS (July 2011), available at
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Clinical-Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-theGaps.aspx.
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independent non-profit organization whose goal is to provide unbiased
advice to government decision makers, was tasked with recommending
which services for women should be mandatory for inclusion in group
health plan coverage.35 The IOM report recommended that any HRSA
guidelines on women’s preventive care include, inter alia, “the full range
of Food and Drug Administration-approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women
with reproductive capacity.”36 Included in the list of Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approved contraceptive methods include oral
contraceptive pills, emergency contraceptives with abortifacient effect
(including Plan B, the “morning-after pill,” and Ella, the “week after
pill”), diaphragms, and intrauterine devices.37
On August 1, 2011, HRSA adopted the IOM’s recommendations,38
and on February 15, 2012, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the Department of Treasury, and the Department of
Labor published rules that finalized HRSA guidelines.39 The one
departure that HRSA made from the IOM recommendations was to
authorize an amendment to the interim final regulations issued on August
1, 2011, granting a limited exemption for certain religious employers.40
Under the exemption encapsulated in this early version of the guidelines,
to qualify as a “religious employer,” an employer needed to satisfy the
following criteria: (1) the inculcation of religious values is the purpose of
the organization; (2) the organization primarily employs persons who
share the religious tenets of the organization; (3) the organization serves
primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization; and
(4) the organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section
6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended.41
This definition of a “religious employer” was an extremely narrow
definition and excluded many of the complainants who are challenging
the Contraception Mandate.42 This included the University of Notre
35.
Id. at 1.
36.
Id. at 3 (recommendation 5.5).
37.
See BIRTH CONTROL GUIDE, FDA OFF. OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/
UCM356451.pdf.
38.
See 76 Fed. Reg. 46621 (Aug. 3, 2011); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011).
39.
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728
(Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 54).
40.
See 76 Fed. Reg. 46621; 45 C.F.R. § 147.130.
41.
See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B).
42.
See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation:
Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and
the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (2012) (discussing the limited scope of the initial
exemption for religious employers under the Contraception Mandate); see also Carol
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Dame (who did not meet at least criteria’s (2), (3), and (4));43 all of the
for-profit religious institution complainants;44 and many of the
Archdiocese-complainants, who through their schools, charities, and
social services (including hospitals) employ and serve persons who do
not share the religious tenets of the organization.45 While there was a
temporary enforcement safe-harbor provision in effect—such that
non-grandfathered group health plans sponsored by certain non-profit
organizations with religious objections to provision of contraception
coverage did not immediately have to provide coverage—this temporary
safe-harbor did not cover many of the above-mentioned institutions.46
In light of these problems, and in the face of strong lobbying efforts
by religious groups, the Obama Administration expanded the definition
of those religious employers that are completely exempt from the
Mandate.47 Under the final rule, the requirements that a “religious
employer” have the purpose of inculcation of religious values, the
employment of persons sharing its religious tenets, and that the
organization primarily serve persons sharing its religious tenets have
been eliminated.48 This means that a wider range of employers claiming
to be religious employers fall within the scope of the exemption.49 The
result of the exemption is that exempt employers may continue to operate
as if the Mandate was not in existence, refusing to extend health plans to
include contraception coverage without any question or consequences—
Keehan, Something Has to Be Fixed, CATHOLIC HEALTH WORLD, Feb. 15, 2012, at 1.
Religious groups not falling within the scope of the Mandate complained that they were
marked as “second class citizens.” See Letter from Thomas J. Olmstead, Catholic Bishop
of Phx., to Brothers Sisters in Christ (Jan. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.diocesephoenix.org/uploads/docs/RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY-INSURANCELETTER-013012.pdf.
43.
See Complaint at 41, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No.
3:12-CV-253-RLM, 2012 WL 6756332 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012) [hereinafter
Complaint, Notre Dame], available at http://uc.nd.edu/assets/69013/hhs_complaint.pdf;
see also HRSA Coverage Guidelines, supra note 32.
44.
See, e.g., Complaint at 28–29, Monaghan v. Sebelius, 931 F. Supp. 2d 794
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (No. 12–15488) [hereinafter Complaint, Monaghan], available at
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Dominos-Complaint.pdf;
see
also HRSA Coverage Guidelines, supra note 32.
45.
See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Sebelius,
907 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-02542-BMC) [hereinafter Complaint,
Archdiocese of N.Y.], available at http://www.archny.org/media/links/FreedomofReligion
_Lawsuit2012.pdf; see also HRSA Coverage Guidelines, supra note 32.
46.
See 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8726–27 (Feb. 15, 2012).
47.
See 45 eC.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013); 78 Fed. Reg. at 39873–74 (2013).
48.
See id. The Mandate exempted those religious institutions falling within the
Internal Revenue Code provisions defining religious organizations. See I.R.C.
§§ 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (2011) (defining religious nonprofit entities for purposes of the
federal income tax code).
49.
See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 31, at 376.
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that is, exempt employers are wholly relieved from the burdens of the
Mandate.50
In addition, the final rule provides for accommodations for other
non-profit religious organizations objecting to the Mandate (and not
falling within the exemption), namely that the employers are not required
to directly provide for contraception coverage.51 Instead, the Mandate
makes provision for coverage directly from health insurers.52
Non-exempt religious employers are entitled to this accommodation if
they meet four criteria: (1) they have religious objections to providing
contraceptives, (2) they are non-profit organizations, (3) they hold
themselves out to be a religious organization, and (4) they “self-certify”
that they meet criteria (1) through (3).53 Additionally, these non-exempt
employers must notify their health plan insurer that they object to
contraception coverage in order to avail themselves of the
accommodation.54
B. The Litigation and the Varieties of Challengers
In the face of the Contraception Mandate, numerous challenges to
the Mandate have been filed in federal court. To date, over 100
complaints, with over 300 plaintiffs, have been filed in federal district
court.55 Those religious institutions that are challenging the contraception
mandate claim that funding, facilitating, or paying for contraception
violates the religious beliefs held by the religious institution.56

50.
Id.
51.
45 eC.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2013); see 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874.
52.
§ 147.131(c)(1)(i); see Religious Employer Exemption, 78 Fed. Reg. at
39873, 39875 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 54.9815-2713A, 29 C.F.R. 2590.715-2713A,
45 C.F.R. 147.131).
53.
§ 147.131(b); see 78 Fed. Reg. at 39874–75.
54.
§ 147.131(c); Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra 31, at 351; see also 78 Fed.
Reg. at 39875. The health plan administrator or insurer is prohibited from asking for
evidence supporting the self-certification and cannot otherwise question the eligibility of
the employer for the accommodation. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39875. For discussion of the
cost-shifting burden that this accommodation imposes on health insurers, see Gedicks &
Van Tassell, supra note 31, at 351–52; Frederick M. Gedicks, Issue Brief, With Religious
Liberty for All: A Defense of the Affordable Care Act’s Contraception Coverage
Mandate, 6 ADVANCE: THE J. OF THE ACS ISSUE GROUPS 135, 145 n.47 (2012)
(summarizing the argument and data on the cost neutrality of shifting the coverage
burden to third-party insurers).
55.
See generally HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 1.
56.
See, e.g., Complaint, Archdiocese of N.Y., supra note 45, at 54 (“The
Catholic Church views abortion, sterilization, and contraception as intrinsically immoral,
and prohibits Catholic organizations from condoning or facilitating those practices.”).
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The complainants can be roughly sorted into four categories.57 First,
there are complaints filed by numerous Catholic Archdioceses.58 To be
clear, these complaints are not limited to a challenge that the various
Catholic houses of worship should not have to provide contraception
coverage (indeed, these houses of worship clearly fall within the auspices
of the religious exemption to the HSRA guidelines). Instead, these
complaints represent the Archdioceses and their related not-for-profit
institutions, including Catholic charities that operate hospitals or provide
other social services—such as the Catholic Mutual Relief Society of
America, Catholic Charities of D.C., and the Catholic Health Services of
Long Island—as well as the related Catholic primary and secondary
schools under the control of the Archdiocese, for example, Pius X
Catholic High School.59 The Archdiocese complaints stipulate a religious
objection to both traditional contraceptives and abortifacients.60 Notably,
the complaints of the houses of worship themselves have either been
dismissed or gone inactive after HHS expanded the original exemption
and eliminated the overly burdensome conditions for churches and other
houses of worship.61 However, many of the complaints relating to the

57.
See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 31, at 353–55 (classifying the
Mandate challengers into three categories: (1) churches, integrated auxiliaries, and
associations; (2) nonprofit religious organizations; and (3) for-profit businesses owned by
religious individuals).
58.
See, e.g., Complaint, Archdiocese of N.Y., supra note 45; Complaint,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Wash. v. Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2012) (No.
12-0815-ABJ); Complaint, Persico v. Sebelius, 919 F. Supp. 2d 622 (W.D. Pa. 2012)
(No. 1:12-cv-123-SJM); Complaint, Zubik v. Sebelius, 911 F. Supp. 2d 314 (W.D. Pa.
2012) (No. 2:12-cv-00676); Complaint, Roman Catholic Diocese of Dall. v. Sebelius, 927
F. Supp. 2d 406 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (No. 3:12-cv-1589-B); Complaint, Diocese of Fort
Wayne-South Bend v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (No.
1:12-cv-159-JD); Complaint, Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Sebelius, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1018
(E.D. Mo. 2012) (No. 4:12-cv-00924-JAR); Complaint, Wenski v. Sebelius, No.
1:12-cv-23820-DLG, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55941 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2012); Complaint,
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-03489-WSD, 2014 WL
125673 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 5, 2012); Complaint, Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius,
No. 3:12-cv-00934, 2012 WL 5879796 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2012); Complaint, Roman
Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth v. Sebelius, No. 4:12-cv-00314-Y, 2013 WL 9600145
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2012); Complaint, Catholic Diocese of Peoria v. Sebelius, No.
1:12-cv-01276, 2013 WL 74240 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2012); Complaint, Catholic Diocese of
Biloxi, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-158HSO-RHW, 2012 WL 6831407 (S.D. Miss. May
21, 2012).
59.
See, e.g., Complaint, Nebraska v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
877 F. Supp. 2d 777 (D. Neb. 2012) (No. 4:12-cv-3035) [hereinafter Complaint,
Nebraska].
60.
Id.
61.
Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 31, at 354; see, e.g., Roman Catholic
Diocese of Dall. v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 406 (N.D. Tex. 2012); Catholic Diocese of
Biloxi, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-158HSO-RHW, 2012 WL 6831407 (S.D. Miss. May
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churches’ interrelated non-profit groups continue as these associations
maintain that even the current accommodation violates their religious
liberty.62
Second, there are those complaints filed by religious universities.63
These include both Catholic universities (for example, the University of
Notre Dame and the Catholic University of America), who object to
traditional contraception as well as abortifacients, and non-Catholic
universities, who, while often not having an objection to traditional
contraception, have a religious objection to abortion-inducing drugs.64
The non-Catholic university complainants include Wheaton College,65
Colorado Christian College, Geneva College, Louisiana College, Grace
College and Seminary, Biola University, East Texas Baptist University,
and Houston Baptist University.66
Third, there are those complaints filed by the owners of for-profit
companies, claiming that the contraception mandate infringes on their
institutional religious liberty by forcing religiously-devout business
owners to provide, without co-pay, contraceptive coverage for their
21, 2012). For a comprehensive listing of the status of each case, see HHS Mandate
Information Central, supra note 1.
62.
Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 31, at 354. For a list of these continuing
cases, see HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 1.
63.
See generally Complaint, Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir.
2011) (No. 10–2347), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012); Complaint, Wheaton Coll. v.
Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 12–5273, 12–5219) [hereinafter Complaint,
Wheaton]; Complaint, Grace Sch. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (No.
3:12–CV–459–JD) [hereinafter Complaint, Grace Sch.]; Complaint, Geneva Coll. v.
Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 402 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 2:12-cv-00207) [hereinafter
Complaint, Geneva Coll.]; Complaint, E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius, 988 F. Supp. 2d
743 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (No. H–cv–03009) [hereinafter Complaint, E. Tex. Baptist Univ.];
Complaint, S. Nazarene Univ. v. Sebelius, No. CIV–13–1015–F, 2013 WL 6804265
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013); Complaint, Franciscan Univ. of Steubenville v. Sebelius,
No. 2:12-cv-440, 2013 WL 1189854 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013); Complaint, Colo.
Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 11-cv-03350-CMA-BNB, 2013 WL 93188 (D. Colo. Jan.
7, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint, Colo. Christian Univ.]; Complaint, Belmont Abbey Coll.
v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:11-cv-01989) [Complaint, Belmont
Abbey Coll.]; Complaint, Notre Dame, supra note 43; Complaint, Ave Maria Univ. v.
Sebelius, No. 2:12-cv-88-FTM-29SPC, 2012 WL 3128015 (M.D. Fla. July 31, 2012);
Complaint, La. Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-00463, 2012 WL 3061500 (W.D. La. July
26, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint, La. Coll.].
64.
See, e.g., Complaint, Colo. Christian Univ., supra note 63; Complaint,
Notre Dame, supra note 43. See generally HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note
1.
65.
Wheaton is an evangelical Christian college in Illinois. About Wheaton,
WHEATON COLLEGE, http://wheaton.edu/About-Wheaton (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
66.
See, e.g., Complaint, Wheaton, supra note 63; Complaint, Colorado
Christian Univ., supra note 63; Complaint, Geneva Coll., supra note 63; Complaint, La.
Coll., supra note 63; Complaint, Grace Sch., supra note 63; Complaint, E. Tex. Baptist
Univ., supra note 63. See generally HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 1.
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employees.67 The for-profit businesses suing over the contraception
mandate include Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,68 Annex Medical, Inc.,
Korte, Autocam, Hercules (Newland), Legatus, O’Brien, Senneca
Hardwood Lumbar Company, Tyndale House Publishers, Grote
Industries, Griesedieck, and Domino’s Farms.69 For these litigants, the
Mandate provides neither an exemption nor an accommodation. This
class of litigants pressed both First Amendment and statutory (RFRA)
claims before the federal courts, with the statutory claim succeeding in
the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.70
Finally, there are complaints filed by a variety of religious lobby
groups—for example, Priests for Life, a pro-life, non-profit organization
for Catholic clergy and laity.71 A number of states have also joined the
complaints filed by the various religious institutions.72

67.
See, e.g., Complaint, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356); Complaint, O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 12-3357, 2014 WL 4401187 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2014); Complaint, Korte v.
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-3841, 13-1077); Complaint, Autocam
Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2673), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 2901
(2014); Complaint, Newland v. Sebelius, 524 Fed. Appx. 706 (10th Cir. 2013) (No.
12-1380), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2902 (2014); Complaint, Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius,
No. 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013); Complaint, Geneva Coll. v.
Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 402 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 2:12-cv-00207); Complaint,
Monaghan, supra note 44; Complaint, Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No.
13-5018, 2013 WL 2395168 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2013); Complaint, Legatus v. Sebelius,
901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (No. 12-cv-12061); Complaint, Grote Indus.,
LLC v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (No. 4:12-cv-00134-SEB-DML);
Complaint, Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No.
12-3459-CV-S-RED, 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012). See generally HHS
Mandate Information Central, supra note 1.
68.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., is a privately held retail chain with more than
600 stores in the United States. Our Company, HOBBY LOBBY,
http://www.hobbylobby.com/our_company/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
69.
See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (denying request for
injunctive relief); Annex Med., Inc., 2013 WL 1276025 (preliminary injunction granted);
Korte, 735 F.3d 654 (injunction granted pending appeal); Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d 618
(denying request for injunction); Newland, 524 Fed. Appx. 706 (preliminary injunction
granted); Legatus, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (preliminary injunction granted for Weingartz
plaintiffs); O’Brien, 2014 WL 4401187 (injunction granted pending appeal); Geneva
Coll., 929 F. Supp. 2d 402; Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2013 WL 2395168; Grote
Indus., LLC, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943 (injunction granted pending appeal); Am. Pulverizer
Co., 2012 WL 6951316 (preliminary injunction granted); Monaghan, 931 F. Supp. 2d
794.
70.
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
71.
See Complaint at 3, 12, Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 1:13-cv-01261, 2013 WL 6672400 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
Complaint,
Priests
for
Life],
available
at
http://www.priestsforlife.org/
hhsmandate/priests-for-life-v-sebelius.pdf; see also Complaint, Am. Family Ass’n v.
Sebelius, No. 1:13–cv–00032-SA-DAS (N.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2013); Complaint, Right to
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C. Challenging the Mandate: Disaggregating the Statutory and
Constitutional Causes of Action
When a litigant claims that her religious liberty has been violated,
there are numerous causes of action available to her, both constitutional
and statutory. This Section will disaggregate each of the core religious
liberty protections available to litigants. In so doing, it will become clear
that the cause of action with which commentators should be most
focused on is the constitutional claim of religious institutionalism. This
cause of action has the most potential to shift the locus of power from the
government and individual citizens to powerful private entities without
any possibility of constitutional review.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION
As I described in an earlier article, generally speaking, all
constitutional persons are protected by the First Amendment Religion
Clauses, and litigants can claim that the government has violated either
or both the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause.73 Pursuant
to the Establishment Clause, litigants can claim that the government is
“establishing” religion by either preferencing one religious sect over
another,74 or benefiting one religion by, for example, requiring or
permitting prayer in public schools or permitting religious symbols in the
public square.75
Under the Free Exercise Clause, there are two alternatives for
litigants who claim that their religious liberty has been burdened by the
government. First, litigants can argue that the government has burdened
their religious belief,76 which if accepted by the court, will result in
Life Michigan v. Sebelius, No. 1:13-CV-01202 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2013). See generally
HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 1.
72.
See, e.g., Complaint, Nebraska, supra note 59. See generally HHS Mandate
Information Central, supra note 1.
73.
See U.S. Const. amend. I. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are
contained within the First Amendment, which reads in pertinent part: “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” Id.; see Robinson, supra note 23, at 202–03 (first articulating the description
outlined here).
74.
See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.”).
75.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60–61 (1985) (striking down a
statute encouraging prayer in school); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127
(1982) (holding unconstitutional a statute that vests in churches the authority to veto
liquor licenses within 500 feet of the church).
76.
See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342–43 (1890); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1879).
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absolute constitutional protection, without any judicial recourse to
balancing tests.77 Second, litigants can claim that the government has
burdened their religious action,78 with the constitutional protection
afforded that religious action being dependent on the nature of the
burden.79 Where religious action is burdened via a discriminatory law,
the resulting protection is strict scrutiny.80 Where the burden on the
religious action is the consequence of a non-discriminatory law (i.e., a
generally applicable law), the burden will be afforded no protection
absent a showing of a “hybrid claim” or an individualized governmental
determination.81 Importantly, under both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses, so long as the litigant can show that her
“religion” is burdened, the rights contained in the Religion Clauses are
applicable to the litigant if that litigant is a constitutional person.82
In addition to the generally applicable Religion Clauses, the
Supreme Court has recently recognized an additional doctrinal path for
litigants to follow.83 However, unlike the generally applicable Religion
Clauses, the institutional category is exclusive and applicable only to
“religious institutions.”84 This means that if the litigant can claim to be a
religious institution for First Amendment purposes, then, to the extent of
the coverage of the institutional right, the institution is afforded absolute

77.
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1962).
78.
See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at
495. The vast majority of Free Exercise Clause litigation involves a claim that a person’s
ability to act in accordance with their beliefs has been burdened. See MICHAEL W.
MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 87–91 (2d ed. 2006).
79.
See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531 (1993); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
80.
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531; Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 406 (invalidating a state law burdening the free exercise of religion); see also
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 870 (2006) (“Strict scrutiny is
always fatal to laws intentionally discriminating against religion . . . .”).
81.
See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 492 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (holding that special
accommodations for religious practices are not constitutionally mandated except for
claims combining a free exercise claim and a claim arising from another constitutional
provision—i.e., “hybrid” claims—or for claims in contexts that “invite consideration
of . . .particular circumstances”). For commentary on the Smith doctrine, see 1 KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 80–81
(2006) (noting that Smith “marks a crucial divide in free exercise law”); Adam Samaha,
Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1291, 1335 (2004).
82.
See LESLIE C. GRIFFIN, LAW AND RELIGION 17 (2d ed. 2010); see also Zoë
Robinson, Constitutional Personhood (draft on file with author).
83.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S.
Ct. 694, 705–06 (2012).
84.
Id. at 706.
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constitutional protection.85 This is a powerful right for any religious
group and one that has the potential to change the landscape of
constitutional rights in the United States.86
2. STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION
In addition to the three core constitutional causes of action, litigants
who believe that their religious liberty has been violated also have access
to a statutory cause of action pursuant to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).87 RFRA was passed in the wake of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith,88 where the
Court significantly weakened the constitutional free exercise
protections.89
Before Smith, people were at least theoretically entitled to
exemptions from any law that substantially burdened their religious
practice unless the law passed strict scrutiny review.90 Smith upended this
protection, holding that neutral and generally applicable laws do not, as a

85.
Importantly, what this does not mean is that the religious liberty of a
constitutional religious institution is protected only to the extent of the coverage of the
institutional right. Instead, to the extent that the institutional litigant claims protection
from government intrusion on religious action that falls outside the scope of the
institutional category, that action may well be protected by the generally applicable
Religion Clauses. See Robinson, supra note 23, at 231–33 (discussing the “fallback
protections” that the generally applicable Religion Clauses provide to those institutions
not classified as a constitutional religious institution).
86.
Id. at 204 (“The institutional category enshrined by Hosanna-Tabor
is . . .a powerful extension of the previously settled Religion Clause doctrine.”); see also
Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821,
837 (2012) (concluding that it “may be the broader doctrinal implications of
Hosanna-Tabor that have the most lasting significance”).
87.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2011).
88.
494 U.S. 782, 884–85 (1990) (holding that burdens on religious action
imposed by neutral laws of general application, such as the federal drug law that
prohibited the use of peyote at issue in Smith, were not subject to strict scrutiny).
89.
See H.R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 2 (1993) (“The Smith majority’s abandonment
of strict scrutiny represented an abrupt, unexpected rejection of longstanding Supreme
Court precedent.”).
90.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963) (applying strict
scrutiny and holding that the Constitution mandated that the plaintiff be exempted from
the generally applicable law). But see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982)
(holding that the government met strict scrutiny and no accommodation was
constitutionally mandated); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994) (specifying that while strict scrutiny usually means
“strict in theory, fatal in fact,” in the context of the Free Exercise Clause it is more apt to
describe the test as “strict in theory but feeble in fact”).
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general matter, violate the Free Exercise Clause.91 In other words, the
Constitution does not compel exemptions from generally applicable laws
even when they burden a person’s religious practice. RFRA was enacted
to “restore” the pre-Smith standard against which federal laws would be
measured: the government must exempt a religious person from a
generally applicable law that substantially burdens her religious practice
unless the government meets strict scrutiny.92
***
The overwhelming focus of commentators responding to the
Contraception Mandate has been on the statutory—RFRA—cause of
action.93 In fact, almost every litigant challenging the Contraception
Mandate has pleaded a RFRA cause of action.94 However, the class of
litigants that has come under the most scrutiny in the context of the
RFRA violation claim is the for-profit corporation class. The specific
question for the for-profit litigant class is whether the protective auspices
of the statute extend to for-profit corporations. Specifically, the question
is one of statutory interpretation—namely whether RFRA’s protection
for “persons”95 should be construed as extending to corporate (i.e.,
non-natural) persons. As noted above, in the context of the for-profit
corporation class, the Supreme Court recently held that RFRA’s
protections extend to cover corporations, and, pursuant to the statute’s
terms, this class’s religious liberty was violated by the Contraception
Mandate.96
Beyond the RFRA claim, commentators tend to morph the
constitutional causes of action into one indistinct “religious liberty
violation” claim rather than separating out the analytically distinct
constitutional claims. This is an error and has led to the many religious
institutionalism claims made by various classes of litigants being
91.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884–85 (holding that burdens on religious action
imposed by neutral laws of general application, such as the federal drug law that
prohibited the use of peyote at issue in Smith, were not subject to strict scrutiny).
92.
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210–12 (1994) (explaining how RFRA
was passed in direct reaction to Smith).
93.
See, e.g., Christiansen, supra note 3, at 623–24; Corbin, The Contraception
Mandate, supra note 13, at 1474–83; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 31, at 343–44;
Sepper, supra note 4, at 309–11; Vischer, supra note 3, at 371–74.
94.
See HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 1.
95.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)
(2011) (“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided for in
subsection (b).”).
96.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014).
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ignored. In a number of the claims, litigants claim that their institutional
rights have been violated. For example, religious university Belmont
Abbey College claims that:
The Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause protect
the freedom of religious organizations to decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of internal governance as
well as those of faith and doctrine . . . . Belmont Abbey College
has made an internal decision, dictated by its Christian faith,
that any health plans it makes available to its employees may
not subsidize, provide, or facilitate access to abortifacient,
sterilization, or contraceptive drugs, devices, or related
services.97
Numerous other Mandate challengers, including other religious
universities (for example, the University of Notre Dame and Wheaton
College)98 and litigants from the other litigant classes defined in the
above section, make similar claims.99 The lower federal courts have by
and large ignored the institutionalism cause of action, focusing instead
on the generally applicable Religion Clauses and/or the RFRA claims.100
The courts that have addressed the question have done so tentatively, and
many seem at a loss as to how to answer the baseline question of whether
the institutional complainant is a religious institution within the scope of
the First Amendment.101 And the Supreme Court ignored all
constitutional claims in its recent Burwell v. Hobby Lobby decision.102
The following Part provides guidance as to how to answer this critical
question, outlining a framework for courts to employ to address this
threshold question before turning to assessing the specific classes of
Mandate challenges that claim to be constitutional religious institutions
in Part III.

97.
Complaint Belmont Abbey College, supra note 63, at 232, 235.
98.
See supra note 10 (collecting cases).
99.
See supra note 10 (collecting cases).
100. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3rd Cir. 2013), rev’d, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751.
101. See generally supra note 15 (outlining the approach of various lower courts
to the question of defining a “religious institution”).
102. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014)
(deciding the issues on a more limited statutory ground).
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II. HOW DO WE IDENTIFY WHICH MANDATE CHALLENGERS ARE
CONSTITUTIONAL “RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS”?
To answer the claim made by some of the Mandate litigants that
they are “constitutional religious institutions” and entitled to “absolute
constitutional protection” from the reach of the Contraception Mandate,
we need some kind of framework to answer the threshold question: who,
or what, is a constitutional religious institution? The problem, of course,
is figuring out how to make constitutional distinctions between
institutions that are constitutional religious institutions and those that are
not. This Part outlines a framework to make these determinations before
applying it to the classes of Mandate challengers in Part III.103
A. What is Religious Institutionalism?
Broadly speaking, religious institutionalism refers to the rights of
religious institutions independent of the rights of individuals.104 More
specifically, religious institutionalism also refers to the exclusive
category of First Amendment rights reserved for constitutional religious
institutions.105 The story of religious institutionalism dates back to the
Supreme Court’s 1871 decision of Watson v. Jones,106 where the Court
determined that it could have no role in adjudicating intra-church
property disputes in order to preserve the autonomy of churches.107
Watson and its progeny have been collectively described as the Court’s

103. The following Part draws substantially from an earlier article, which
articulates in depth the phenomenon of religious institutionalism and the appropriate
framework for identifying constitutional religious institutions. See Robinson, note 23, at
189–93 (examining in depth the issue of identifying constitutional religious institutions).
What follows is the relevant portions of that article necessary to identify those
constitutional mandate litigants that should be considered constitutional religious
institutions.
104. See id. at 206–08.
105. Id. at 182 (discussing constitutional religious institutionalism); see also
Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the
Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289, 289–93 (2012). Compare
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L.
REV. 917, 919–21 (2013) (arguing that religious institutions do not give rise to a special
set of rights, autonomy, or sovereignty separate from individual rights of conscience),
with Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 1049, 1061–63
(2013).
106. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). For an excellent overview and greater illumination of
the decision and its importance, see Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 447, 456–59 (2009); Lund, supra note 14, at 12–15.
107. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729.
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“hands-off” approach to religious institutions, requiring the government
to defer to the will of the institution.108
The story of modern religious institutionalism was heralded by the
Court in its 2012 decision of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. E.E.O.C.109 Hosanna-Tabor involved the firing of
an elementary school teacher, Cheryl Perich, from the
religiously-affiliated Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School.110 Perich was employed as a “called teacher”—a teacher voted as
such by the congregation after satisfying religious education
requirements—and fired after she refused to step down following an
extended disability leave.111 After she was fired, Perich filed an EEOC
complaint that Hosanna-Tabor defended by claiming the suit was barred
by the First Amendment religion clause’s “ministerial exception.”112
In agreeing with Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held that the internal
governance of a religious institution is absolutely protected by the First
Amendment.113 In other words, the Americans with Disabilities Act (or
any other employment law) cannot be applied to restrict the conduct of
religious institutions when it infringes on the institution’s ability to
“shape its own faith and mission.”114
Religious institutionalism, then, refers to the entrenched
constitutional principle of institutional separation, whereby the

108. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 697–98 (1976); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445–47 (1969); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,
363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in
N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 114–16 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,
280 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1929); Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1, 2 (1918). On the development
of the Court’s religious institutionalism, see Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach
to Religious Doctrine: What Are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 845
(2009) (describing the “cluster of [church autonomy] cases that seem to illustrate and
confirm the hands-off rule”); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in
Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1847 (1998) (describing
Watson as “[t]he [o]rigin of a ‘[h]ands-[o]ff’ [a]pproach”); Lund, supra note 14, at 16;
see also Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a
Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 299–300 (1994)
(“[T]he Court’s early church property decisions indicate that courts should not attempt to
resolve ‘internal’ church disputes.”); William Johnson Everett, Ecclesial Freedom and
Federal Order: Reflections on the Pacific Homes Case, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 371, 382
(1996) (“A long series of legal precedents ha[s] confirmed that civil courts cannot
interfere in internal church disputes.”).
109. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
110. Id. at 699–700.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 701.
113. Id. at 706.
114. Id.
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institutions of church and state are to be separate and distinct.115 More
broadly, however, religious institutionalism singles out religious
institutions as special rights holders.116 The threshold, antecedent
question, then, is which institutions are religious institutions for the
purposes of this special constitutional protection.
B. Are All Associational Forms Constitutional “Religious Institutions”?
While most of us would readily identify a local house of worship as
a religious institution, the question becomes more complicated as we pan
out from the core. For example, many local houses of worship belong to
hierarchical organizations that mandate conduct and direct belief.117
While it seems intuitive that the broader hierarchical religious
organizations are themselves religious institutions insofar as they are
directly involved in the formulation and dissemination of religious
doctrine, the issue becomes increasingly complicated once we try to
account for the various subsidiary organizations funded and managed by
the broader hierarchical organization. These subsidiary organizations can
include hospitals, for-profit businesses, schools, universities, and
not-for-profit organizations. In addition, many universities and schools
not expressly managed by, or affiliated with, a hierarchical religious
order identify as religious.118 Then there are the slew of for-profit
businesses that claim to be run in accordance with religious doctrine.119
The question is, which of these institutions is a constitutional
religious institution? Are they all constitutional religious institutions,
able to organize at least some of their affairs independent of state
regulation? Are only some of them?
In an earlier article, I suggested that the most promising starting
point for identifying constitutional religious institutions is to pinpoint the
unique functions these institutions fulfill that differ from those fulfilled

115. For a discussion of the historic origins of institutional separation, see Carl
H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early
American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1497.
116. See Robinson, supra note 23, at 181–83. For a discussion of the normative
question of religious institutions as special constitutional rights holders, see, for example,
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 105, at 925–26.
117. For example, the Catholic Church is one such hierarchical organization. See
POPE JOHN PAUL II, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 874–96 (2d ed. 2000),
available at http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catechism
/catechism-of-the-catholic-church/epub/index.cfm.
118. See complaints cited supra note 63 (outlining examples of educational
institutional complainants).
119. See generally supra notes 55–72 and accompanying text (outlining the
classes of litigants challenging the Contraception Mandate).
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by other institutions.120 Examining the body of the Supreme Court’s
religious institutionalism decisions, I claimed that, when speaking of
religious institutions, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
constitutional religious institutions fulfill three primary functions.121
These functions are: protection of group rights, protection of individual
conscience, and provision of desirable societal structures.122 While other
institutions that value religion might at times serve one or more of these
functions, constitutional religious institutions have a primary
commitment to these roles that reach far beyond the efforts of other
institutions. While my earlier article examines each of these values
in-depth,123 it is useful to briefly consider each value here, before turning
to identify functional guidelines based on these values that aim to guide
the courts in identifying those institutions that best fulfill the functions of
constitutional religious institutions.
First, undergirding the Supreme Court’s religious institutionalism
jurisprudence is the protection of religious group rights. By this, I mean
that driving the Court’s religious institutionalism decisions is a view that
religious institutions are uniquely autonomous in our governmental
structures.124 To that end, the Court has taken a hands-off approach to
cases that involve certain intra-institutional decisions, holding that the
Constitution directs that religious institutions are to be accorded special
solicitude over at least matters of faith and doctrine.125 For the Court,
120. Robinson, supra note 23, at 206–08 (specifying that the most
constitutionally sound way to design a framework for identifying constitutional religious
institutions is to ascertain those values that undergird the Court’s institutionalism
decisions).
121. Id. at 208 (outlining the three values undergirding the Court’s religious
institutionalism jurisprudence).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 206–25 (examining each of the values in depth).
124. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private
Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 149 (2003); Robinson, supra note 23, at 208–13
(outlining in detail the claim that the Court’s religious institutionalism jurisprudence is at
least partially animated by protection of group rights); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Law
Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937). For various perspectives on
how private organizations exercise governmental power, see Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth
Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 165, 169–74 (1989) (analyzing categories of private exercise of government
power according to the formality of the relationship between the government and private
actor); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
547 (2000) (conceiving of governance as a set of negotiated relationships between private
and public actors); David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61
IND. L.J. 647, 694–95 (1986) (outlining a proposal for a due-process analysis of private
delegations of public power).
125. See Robinson, supra note 23, at 212 (discussing Hosanna-Tabor); see also
Hills, Jr., supra note 124, at 149–52; Wasserman, supra note 105, at 297. Note that in his
characterization of the rights of religious institutions, Paul Horwitz uses the term “sphere
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there appears to be something special about religious groups qua
religious groups that itself requires the Court cede jurisdictional authority
over specific, uniquely religious, matters.126
Second, and relatedly, the Court’s religious institutionalism
jurisprudence reflects the valuing of religious institutions as facilitators
of individual religious liberty.127 In this way, the special constitutional
solicitude accorded religious institutions is justified on the basis that the
institution both supports and promotes individual religious choice.128
Implicit in this value is an understanding of religious liberty that moves
beyond a traditional conception of religious freedom as an individual
endeavor. Instead, the Court’s religious institutionalism jurisprudence
recognizes that exercise of individual religious conscience is frequently a
communal endeavor.129 To that end, when religious individuals band
together in a community of faith, the Court has been willing to recognize
the rights of religious institutions as facilitators and protectors of those
individual rights. Religious institutions, then, are places where individual
religious conscience is practiced, formed, and preserved.130
Consequently, when individuals form a group to exercise rights of
religious conscience, “there is . . . agreement on the fundamentals of the
collective form that are necessary to protect [the] individual conscience
sovereignty.” Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty
and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 83 (2009). Horwitz derives this term from a
unique and very specific reference, the Calvinist theorist Abraham Kuyper. Id. Despite
the narrow derivation, sphere sovereignty is terminology that could also be apt in this
context, as it is used to describe an institution that has a specified sphere of authority, to
the exclusion of all other entities. Id. at 94.
126. Robinson, supra note 23, at 213.
127. Id. at 213–19 (examining in depth the proposition that the Court’s religious
institutionalism jurisprudence reflects a concern for individual religious liberty).
128. On the view that religious institutional freedom derives its validity from its
individual belief-enforcing function, see, for example, Bagni, supra note 15; Douglas
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1981).
Compare Mark F. Kohler, Comment, Equal Employment or Excessive Entanglement?
The Application of Employment Discrimination Statutes to Religiously Affiliated
Organizations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 581, 589–90 (1986), with Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise
Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 391, 395 (1987).
129. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Group Autonomy: Further
Reflections About What Is at Stake, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 153, 155 (2006); Kathleen A.
Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1675 [hereinafter Brady, Religious Organizations] (stating that
religious groups are connected to individual religious convictions because “[i]ndividuals
express and exercise their beliefs in religious communities, and religious organizations
also play an essential role in shaping the beliefs that individuals hold”).
130. Brady, Religious Organizations, supra note 129, at 1675; see also
Robinson, supra note 23, at 216.
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rights.”131 In this way, the institution becomes more than a collective of
individual rights and evolves into an independent entity that protects a
collective expression of faith. The religious institution, then, is not
merely a representative of individual conscience, it is essential to the
exercise of conscience.132 In this way, while the rights of religious
institutions are parasitic on individual religious liberty, they are also
independent of individuals.133 The Court’s religious institutionalism
project, then, values the collective expression of faith that a religious
institution enshrines.
Finally, the Court’s religious institutionalism jurisprudence reflects
a view that religious institutions provide democratically desirable social
structures.134 Undergirding the special solicitude accorded religious
institutions is an understanding that religious groups provide two distinct
social benefits. First, religious institutions facilitate social engagement by
inculcating groups of people with civic morality.135 Historically, the state
has entrusted the development and advancement of civic morals to
religious organizations.136 At the same time, the state has traditionally
recognized that implicit in the delegation of this social function is an
understanding that the state not dictate the work of those institutions in
that respect to avoid political coloring of religion.137 Taken to the
extreme, if religion is corrupted, so too is the citizenry, and the very
fabric of the civil state will unravel.138 Second, symbiotic with the view
of religious institutions as protectors of public virtue is the understanding
131. Robinson, supra note 23, at 216–18 (stating that religious conscience is
fostered and nurtured in groups).
132. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 3, at 53–54, 65; Paul C. Fricke,
The Associational Thesis: A New Logic for Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 53 HOW. L.J.
133, 161 (2009) (discussing how Locke’s Letter demonstrates his belief that “religion
starts and ends with a community of believers; it is thoroughly associational”). Many
religion scholars have sided with Locke’s associational view of religion. Id. at 173–74.
133. See sources cited supra note 132. Compare Schragger & Schwartzman,
supra note 105, with Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?,
28–30 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
11-061, 2011) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412.,
and Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1878–80 (2009).
134. Robinson, supra note 23, at 219–24.
135. See id. at 220–22 (discussing the social function of religious institutions in
American society).
136. See Esbeck, supra note 115, at 1395.
137. Robinson, supra note 23, at 221–22; see also JOSEPH RAZ, RIGHTS AND
INDIVIDUAL WELL-BEING IN ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF
LAW AND POLITICS 6 (1994); John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of
Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 386
(1996).
138. Robinson, supra note 23, at 222.
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that religious institutions should act to protect the state from religious
involvement.139 By carving out autonomous space for religious
institutions, the understanding was that civil authorities would be
protected from the potentially disruptive influence of religion on
government.140 The judicial valuing of religious institutions as private
sovereigns, then, recognizes the independent democratic desirability of
those structures.141
What remains is to identify some tangible principles from these
values—religious sovereignty, individual conscience, democratically
valuable structures—in order to articulate workable guidelines for
identifying constitutional religious institutions.
C. Guidelines for Identifying Constitutional “Religious Institutions”
Drawing on the values summarized in the above section, my earlier
article proposed a set of guidelines, comprising four discrete factors that
courts can use to determine whether any given religious institution is a
constitutional religious institution: (1) recognition as a religious
institution,
(2)
functions
as
a
religious
institution,
(3) voluntariness, and (4) privacy-seeking.142 These guidelines act as
reliable proxies, based on a secure theoretical foundation, that will
facilitate courts in identifying those institutions that best fulfill the
unique constitutional functions of the religious institution. While my
earlier article examined each factor and their relationship to the various
values in depth, this Section provides a summary of the core features of
each factor, before turning to apply the guidelines to the claimants in the
mandate litigation in Part III.143

139. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132
S. Ct. 694, 703 (2012) (emphasizing the Religion Clauses’s purpose as prohibiting a
federal religion); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (“The clearest command of
the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another.”); PETER J. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 29 (1977) (describing “‘no
establishment of religion’” as meaning that the state does not favor any religious
institution over others); Zoë Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative
Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133,
144 (2011).
140. Robinson, supra note 23, at 222–23; see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle,
The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV.
37, 53 (2002); Robinson, supra note 139, at 144–45.
141. Robinson, supra note 23, at 219.
142. This framework was first articulated in id. at 225–29.
143. For an in-depth discussion of the relationship between the values and the
consequent guidelines, see id. at 224–30.
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Recognition as a religious institution. The first factor relies on
third-party recognition of what a constitutional religious institution looks
like.144 This factor allows us to capture within the category those
institutions that have as their goal uniquely religious objectives.145 If we
value individual religious conscience, it makes sense that a constitutional
religious institution is one that third-parties recognize as providing space
to achieve religious objectives. That is, if a driver of the Court’s special
solicitude toward religious institutions is that these institutions facilitate
individual religious belief and conduct, then the institution must
necessarily be recognizable as a religious institution.146 Equally, the
valuing of religious institutions as facilitators of social engagement
suggests that third-party recognition of an institution as a religious
institution is important. To the extent that institutions are viewed as a
locus of civic virtue acts, this can buttress any claim for recognition as a
constitutional religious institution.
More practically, determining whether an institution is a religious
institution through the lens of third-party recognition will involve some
consideration of the functional attributes of the institution.147 That is,
assessing whether a third party would consider any given institution a
religious institution means looking to the day-to-day functions of the
institution with the view toward determining whether a third party would
consider the institution as distinctly religious. Courts could reference for
144. Id. at 225–27 (discussing the recognition factor).
145. Robinson, supra note 23, at 225. Recognition as a religious institution is a
critical measure for many courts asking the question of what a religious institution is in
various statutory contexts. For lower court attempts to answer the question of who—or
what—is a “religious institution” in various statutory contexts, see supra note 15
(outlining prior attempts of lower federal courts to define a “religious institution” in
various statutory contexts).
146. Third-party recognition is similar to the approach taken by the Court in
Hosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.,
132 S. Ct. 694, 699–700, 707–08 (2012); see also Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2455–56 (2014) (utilizing Hosanna-Tabor in uncovering a
meaningful approach to defining “the press” for First Amendment purposes).
147. Robinson, supra note 23, at 226. Lower courts have taken a similar
approach in attempts to define a “religious institution” for various statutory provisions.
See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–26 (6th Cir. 2007);
Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310–11 (4th Cir.
2004) (noting that “the Hebrew Home maintained a rabbi on its staff, employed
mashgichim to ensure compliance with the Jewish dietary laws, and placed a mezuzah on
every resident’s doorpost”); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929
F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991) (“The hospital’s Board of Directors consists of four church
representatives and their unanimously agreed-upon nominees” and that defendant’s
“Articles of Association may be amended only with the approval of the Episcopal
Diocese of Missouri of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America
and the local Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).”); Altman v. Sterling
Caterers, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1384–85 (S.D. Fla. 2012).
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example, whether the institution publicizes a religious mission, whether
the functions of the institution are religiously based or oriented, and
whether entry into the institution requires some commitment of
conscience on the part of the individual.
Functions as a religious institution. The second factor is intimately
related to the first and requires that the institution claiming the status of
constitutional religious institution be structurally capable of promoting
individual conscience and morality.148 If a feature of constitutional
religious institutions is at least to partially generate norms among a
collective of citizens, it seems essential that the institution somehow
functions as a religious institution.149 While the first
factor—third-party recognition—asks whether a person would perceive
that the institution is a religious institution, this factor questions whether
the institution is in fact fulfilling its role as a religious institution.150
Voluntariness. The third factor focuses on the value of protection of
individual religious liberty, and specifies that for an institution to be
considered a religious institution, entrance into that institution must be
voluntary.151 That is, the individual must at least know that she is
entering into a religious institution that she can exit at will.152 In this
way, the individual will be given an opportunity to determine whether
any given institution will best serve her conscience and opt in, or out, at
her choosing. With the Court’s religious institutionalism jurisprudence
valuing group rights and leaving governance of that group to each
institution, it is critical that individuals have a choice whether to be
subject to the constraints of that private sovereignty.153 Concurrent with
148. Robinson, supra note 23, at 225, 227–28.
149. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11–14 (1983).
150. This is similar to the approach the Court took in determining whether the
plaintiff was a “minister” in Hosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708
(giving weight to the fact that “Perich’s job duties reflected a role in conveying the
Church’s message and carrying out its mission” and observing that “Perich performed an
important role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation”); West, supra
note 146, at 2455–56 (analyzing Hosanna-Tabor for the purposes of establishing a
framework for identifying the “press” for First Amendment purposes).
151. Robinson, supra note 23, at 228–29.
152. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.10 (1961) (quoting 4
JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, 194 (2d ed. 1836)); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86
(1944); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 221–22 (1996); Esbeck, supra note 115, at
1395–97; Hills, Jr., supra note 124, at 151; Laycock, supra note 128, at 1403.
153. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 614 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(describing the Watson rule as requiring that courts “give effect in all cases to the
decisions of the church government agreed upon by the members before the dispute
arose”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 726–29 (1871).
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the freedom to organize, then, must be the freedom of choice of
individuals whether to affiliate with and submit to the sovereignty of an
institution.
Privacy-seeking. Finally, in light of the religious institutionalism
value of supporting democratically desirable structures, to be considered
a constitutional religious institution, the institution claiming to be a
constitutional religious institution should seek disengagement from the
formal apparatus of the state.154
***
Having set out a preliminary framework for determining what types
of institutions fall within the First Amendment’s religious
institutionalism category, the following Part circles back to the
Contraception Mandate and examines the claims of the various classes of
litigants that they are constitutional religious institutions and, therefore,
potentially free from the obligation to comply with the terms of the
Mandate.

III. USING THE MANDATE CHALLENGERS TO EXPERIMENT WITH
IDENTIFYING CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Using the framework outlined in Part II, this Part will apply that
framework to three classes of religious institutions who have brought
claims challenging the Contraception Mandate: religious universities,
religious-based businesses, and religious interest groups. Each of these
institutional forms requires nuanced line-drawing, with each class
presenting its own difficulties.
A. Religious Universities
The United States has a long and rich tradition of institutions of
higher education dating back to the foundation of Harvard College in
1636.155 At the advent of the Revolutionary War, there were nine
colleges in the colonies, some public and some private.156 The number of
both public and private universities in the United States grew quickly

154. Robinson, supra note 23, at 229.
155. JUDITH AREEN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
27 (2d ed. 2009); History of Harvard University, HARV. U., http://www.harvard.edu/
history (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
156. AREEN, supra note 155, at 27; History, RUTGERS, http://uwide.rutgers.edu/
about/history (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
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after the nation’s founding and continued to expand rapidly following the
passage of the Morrill Act of 1862, which established the land-grant
universities.157 Many of these institutions were founded on religious
principles. For example, Harvard was founded by Congregationalists,
and one of its specified goals was: “Let every student be plainly
instructed and earnestly pressed to consider well the main end of his life
and studies is to know God and Jesus Christ, which is eternal life, and
therefore to lay Christ in the bottom, as the only foundation of all sound
knowledge and learning.”158 However, over one hundred years ago,
Harvard, like many of the early American universities founded on
religious principles,159 removed almost all vestiges of religion from the
institution and has surrendered its religious commitment.160
A significant number of American universities, however, remain
intentionally religiously conscious. These intentionally religious
universities—of which there are an estimated 800 to 1,000—comprise
more than one-third of the colleges and universities in the nation.161 The
relationship between the educational institution and the affiliate religion
is varied, ranging from formal control by religious church authorities and
religious orders to civilly-controlled incorporated entities that follow the
faith and doctrine of the religion voluntarily.162
Importantly, by “religiously conscious” I mean that these
universities still hold on to a “serious commitment to the church while
simultaneously striving for a respectable measure of academic

157. Gregory J. Vincent, Reviving the Land-Grant Idea Through
Community-University Partnerships, 31 S.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
158. FREDERICK EBY, CHRISTIANITY AND EDUCATION 67–74 (1915); Larry Lyon
et al., Making Sense of a “Religious” University: Faculty Adaptations and Opinions at
Brigham Young, Baylor, Notre Dame, and Boston College, 43 REV. RELIGIOUS RES., 326,
326 (2002) (quoting EBY, supra, at 67).
159. For example, Princeton was founded by Presbyterians, Brown by Baptists,
and Yale by Congregationalists. See GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 52–53,
56–57 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, The Constitution and the Religious University, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 479 (1998); Lyon et al., supra note 158, at 326.
160. See William B. Adrian Jr., The Christian University: Maintaining
Distinctions in a Pluralistic Culture, in MODELS FOR CHRISTIAN HIGHER EDUCATION:
STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 445 (Richard T. Hughes &
William B. Adrian eds., 1997); Carter, supra note 159, at 479.
161. See Carter, supra note 159, at 480.
162. See JOHN J. MCGRATH, CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
CANONICAL AND CIVIL LAW STATUS 33–36 (1968); see also Mary Patricia Golden, Civil
Law and Canon Law—Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 955, 956
(1987); Marjorie R. Maguire, Having One’s Cake and Eating It Too: Government
Funding and Religious Exemptions for Religiously Affiliated Colleges and Universities,
1989 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1069, 1119; Joseph R. Preville, Catholic Colleges, the Courts,
and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Cases, 58 CHURCH HIST. 197, 204 n.22 (1989).
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excellence.”163 Significant work has been done on identifying
non-intrusive indicators of an intentionally religious institution. These
indicators include: (1) an institutional mission statement that
acknowledges a specific link or relationship to a church or religious
heritage,164 (2) an institutional mission statement that includes at least
one explicitly religious goal,165 or (3) an institutional commitment to a
core curriculum that requires a religion course that reflects and supports
the institution’s religious affiliation or identity.166
For example, at the University of Notre Dame, an elite Catholic
university in Indiana, all students are required to take a defined religious
studies course, another theology course of the student’s choosing, and
two philosophy courses.167 The University of Notre Dame specifies that
it is a:
Catholic community of higher learning, animated from its
origins by the Congregation of the Holy Cross. The university
is dedicated to the pursuit and sharing of truth for its own sake.
As a Catholic university, one of its distinctive goals is to
provide a forum where through free inquiry and open
discussion, the various lines of Catholic thought may intersect
with all forms of knowledge found in the arts, sciences,
professions, and every other area of human scholarship and
creativity.168
Similar course and mission commitments can be seen at other
institutions, including Baylor in Texas, Boston College in Massachusetts,
and Brigham Young University in Utah.169
Many students choose to study at these religiously affiliated
institutions because they provide an environment that is not only
compatible with, but congenial to, religious belief.170 Similarly, many
faculty members choose to work at a religiously affiliated university for
the same reasons. The availability of this choice—to study or work at a

163. Lyon et al., supra note 158, at 326.
164. MERRIMON CUNINGGIM, UNEASY PARTNERS: THE COLLEGE AND THE
CHURCH 99 (1994).
165. MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY AS PROMISE AND
PROJECT: REFLECTIONS IN A JESUIT IDIOM 6–7 (1998).
166. Mark R. Schwehn, A Christian University: Defining the Difference, FIRST
THINGS, no. 93, May 1999, at 25–26.
167. Lyon et al., supra note 158, at 329.
168. Id. (quoting COLLOQUY, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME CATALOGUE (2000)).
169. See id. at 329–30.
170. Carter, supra note 159, at 480; James D. Gordon III, Religiously Affiliated
Law Schools, Values, and Professionalism, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 151, 151 (2009).
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religiously affiliated institution of higher learning—“contribute[s] to the
overall freedom of religion” which encapsulates more than belief and
worship in a church, but instead “includes the nurturing of a lively
plurality, not simply of religious ideals about the life well-lived, but of
lives well lived in accordance with religious ideals.”171 This religious
freedom is only possible because the autonomy of religious universities
has typically been respected, and the religious institution has been able to
define its own understanding of morality and the good life. If the state
had been able to interfere in the religious university’s mission, “[t]he
state might become committed to its own meaning and destroy the
personal and educative bond that is the germ of meanings alternate to
those of the power wielders.”172
Higher education is exalted in our nation, and, because of this, the
intentionally religious university has a unique opportunity to shape and
mold students in accordance with religious principles and morals.173 One
specific moral perspective is the one that the Contraception Mandate
raises. Of those plaintiffs that have filed challenges against the Mandate,
a significant number are universities.174 One of the most prominent
institutional plaintiffs is the University of Notre Dame.175 The University
of Notre Dame was founded in 1842 by a priest of the Congregation of
Holy Cross and officially chartered in 1844.176 The goal of the University
of Notre Dame is to “provide a Catholic educational environment that
prepares students spiritually and intellectually for their future vocations
and careers.”177 In terms of leadership structure, the President of the
University of Notre Dame has always been a priest from the
Congregation of Holy Cross, and the governance structure contains
mandated religious leaders.178
The University of Notre Dame is expressly and openly Catholic in
its identity and mission and, to wit, ensures that its employee health
insurance plans do not include coverage for abortifacients, contraception,
sterilization, or related educative services.179 The University of Notre
171. See Carter, supra note 159, at 480.
172. Cover, supra note 149, at 62.
173. See Eugene H. Bramhall & Ronald Z. Ahrens, Academic Freedom and the
Status of the Religiously Affiliated University, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 227, 250, 252
(2001–02); Carter, supra note 159, at 185; Gordon III, supra note 170, at 151–52;
Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1458 (1987–88); Lyon et al., supra note 158, at 344–45.
174. See supra note 10 (collecting cases).
175. See Complaint, Notre Dame, supra note 43.
176. Id. at 5.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 7, 10.
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Dame’s complaint specifies that faith is “at the heart of Notre Dame’s
educational mission.”180 The University of Notre Dame’s faith-based
approach to higher education is based on the apostolic constitution Ex
Corde Ecclesiae, and accordingly, “Notre Dame believes and teaches
that ‘besides the teaching, research and services common to all
Universities,’ it must ‘bring to its task the inspiration and light of the
Christian message.’”181 For the University of Notre Dame, “‘Catholic
teaching and discipline are to influence all university activities . . . [and]
any official action or commitment of the University [must] be in accord
with its Catholic identity.’”182 The University of Notre Dame follows one
of the central tenets of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, that the
“‘dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and
likeness of God,’”183 therefore, “‘[h]uman life must be respected and
protected absolutely from the moment of conception.’”184 Consequently,
the Catholic Church and the University of Notre Dame believe that
contraception and abortion are prohibited.185 The Contraception
Mandate, then, imposes a significant burden on the University of Notre
Dame’s religious liberty: either it must provide coverage for
contraception and abortifacients contrary to religious principles, or bear
the financial burden of the penalties, estimated to be in the millions of
dollars.186
The question is, of course, whether religious universities like the
University of Notre Dame and Ave Maria University qualify as religious
institutions under the preliminary framework. Based on the above
discussion, it seems clear that they do. In particular, the first and second
factors—suggesting that an institution will only be considered a
constitutional religious institution if they are recognized as a religious
institution by third parties and they function as a religious
institution—are readily apparent in the case of at least some religious
universities.187
180. Id. at 27.
181. Id. at 28 (quoting Ex Corde Ecclesiae: Apostolic Constitution of the
Supreme Pontiff John Paul II on Catholic Universities, at *4, available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_
apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae_en.html [hereinafter Ex Corde Ecclesiae]) (brackets
omitted).
182. Id. (quoting Ex Corde Ecclesiae, supra note 181, at *13).
183. Id. (quoting POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 117, ¶ 1700).
184. Id. (quoting POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 117, ¶ 2270).
185. POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 117, ¶¶ 2271–72, 2370, 2399; see
Complaint, Notre Dame, supra note 43, at 28.
186. POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 117, ¶¶ 2271–72, 2370, 2399; see
Complaint, Notre Dame, supra note 43, at 12–13, 47.
187. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text (discussing the recognition
and functional factors).
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It seems clear that the University of Notre Dame and the other
educational challengers to the Mandate are organizations that openly
provide space for individuals to achieve uniquely religious
objectives—namely higher education that is both faith-based and
faith-directed.188 If the value of constitutional religious institutions is to
provide groups with space to develop and disseminate religious views
and to allow individuals who opt into the institution the opportunity to
develop their conscience, then religious higher education organizations
meet that goal. Institutions like the University of Notre Dame were
specifically founded on, and continue in existence with, the mission of
providing higher education through the lens of a specific religious
viewpoint.189 The University of Notre Dame and the other institutions
hold themselves out as religious institutions that provide an education
that is distinct from an education at a secular institution.190 The
institutions in question publicize their distinct religious mission, and the
education they provide is directed by that mission.
The University of Notre Dame and other consciously religious
universities were deliberately formed and continue to exist as
independent facilitators of individual religious conscience and thereby
the freedom of individual religious choice.191 The institutions
deliberately nurture, foster, and protect individual faith. While the
religious university is an educational institution, it is clear that the
institutional commitment is to education through the lens of faith. The
purpose of the institution itself is binary: The religious university persists
not only to ensure higher education, but to present that education through
the lens of a particular faith tradition, and, therefore, to facilitate the
dissemination and expression of religious doctrine.
Courts will, of course, need to consider each institution individually
and examine the sub-factors discussed in the framework; however, a
basic analysis suggests that as a general matter, religious universities
should be considered (or at least eligible to be considered) to meet the
first factor of third-party recognition.
Relatedly, the voluntary factor seems to be met:192 attendance and/or
employment at consciously religious educational institutions are entirely
voluntary, with clear institutional entry and exit points for members of
the university. Students and employees who enter a consciously religious
university like Notre Dame do so with the knowledge that they are
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
factor).

See Complaint, Notre Dame, supra note 43, at 28.
See id. at 5.
See id. at 5, 7.
See supra notes 173–86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text (discussing the voluntary
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entering a Catholic university that follows the teachings of the Catholic
Church. If those teachings are antithetical to the morality or beliefs of the
individuals entering the educational institution, they have the right to exit
that institution.
With the individual’s choice to opt into a consciously religious
university with an openly religious charter and governing documents,
then, comes an acceptance of the institutional governance and ordering
decisions. If the individual has chosen to continue her education or
employment at a consciously religious educational institution, then she
must accept that the education and employment environment, and related
institutional functions, are provided through the lens of the collective
expression of faith of the underlying religious mission. If the student or
employee is unhappy with the collective faith, then, much like citizens
can lobby the state to change a policy position, she can do the same
within the institution’s internal governance structures. She can leave the
institution. She cannot, however, force the institution to moderate its
faith position by using the state as a regulatory tool.
This consideration of the preliminary framework vis-à-vis religious
universities seems normatively correct. If we recall the basic values of
religious institutions, these values suggest that the First Amendment
protects certain religious institutions because of their continuing capacity
to contribute to valuable collective goods in a way that the government is
unable to do. It seems clear, then, that religious universities should be
given religious sovereignty, or what Joseph Raz terms “preemptive
authority” to displace state decisions,193 including the authority to reject
the application of the Contraception Mandate to the institution.
B. Faith-Based Businesses
A unique question is raised by for-profit businesses owned or
controlled by persons of faith which are increasingly seeking to
implement their religious beliefs and practices into the workplace. The
arguments in favor of recognizing a right of religious liberty for
for-profit corporations range from doctrinal—i.e., building on the
Court’s evolving corporate First Amendment freedoms194—to
policy-based—i.e., if the Religion Clauses guarantee the right to live life
193. RAZ, supra note 137, at 44–59.
194. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that the First
Amendment protects corporate political speech); see also Prima Iglesia Bautista Hispana
of Boca Raton v. Broward Cnty., 4502 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[C]orporations
possess Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal protection, due process, and through the
doctrine of incorporation, the free exercise of religion.”); David Graver, Comment,
Personal Bodies: A Corporeal Theory of Corporate Personhood, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 235, 236 (1999).
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consistent with one’s own faith, that right should traverse the workplace
threshold.195
The Contraception Mandate challenges serve to highlight the unique
issue of faith-based businesses. In the case of Hobby Lobby, Inc., for
example, the company had decided not to provide health insurance
coverage for contraception or sterilization.196 What if, however, the
company wanted to implement their faith in hiring practices and refused
to hire gay and lesbian employees? What if the company wanted to
refuse service to Latino or African American customers?
The basic concept of a “corporation” is straightforward: a
corporation is a collective of individuals pursuing a shared goal.197 As a
technical matter, as a business entity distinct from other types of business
forms, the modern corporation is typified by a number of characteristics,
including (but not limited to) limited liability, transferability of
ownership, indefinite existence, separation of ownership and control, and
separate entity status.198 Importantly, from very early in the history of
corporate law, corporations have been assumed to enjoy the status of
“legal person”—i.e., the corporation itself is an entity distinct from its
human members and in possession of its own set of rights and
obligations.199 Today, the modern corporation holds various rights

195. See Karen C. Cash & George R. Gray, A Framework for Accommodating
Religion and Spirituality in the Workplace, 14 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 124, 124 (2000)
(“Business periodicals are filled with articles heralding both the renewed interest in
religion and the growing emphasis on spirituality in society in general and in the
workplace.”); Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 3, at 3; Fricke, supra note
132, at 161, 170 (claiming that the associational aspect of religion is imperative);
Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and the Workplace: A Social Science Perspective, 30 COMP.
PAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474, 481 (2009) (“[The] intergralist style of religious
commitment . . .contradicts the norms of secularization . . .[and sees] religion not as one
isolated aspect of human existence but rather as a comprehensive system more or less
present in all domains of the individual’s life.”).
196. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
197. Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership Limited: Reconciling Traditional and
Progressive Corporate Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. CORP.
L. 247, 250–52 (2008) [hereinafter Colombo, Ownership Limited] (outlining the history
of the corporation generally).
198. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 3, at 48; Colombo, Ownership
Limited, supra note 197, at 250–52; David A. Skeel, Jr., Christianity and the Large Scale
Corporation, in PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES 2 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch.,
Jan. 15, 2007), available at papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1025959.
199. P.W. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 1–2 (Augustus M.
Kelley 1971) (1938); George F. Deiser, The Juristic Person, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 131,
131–32 (1908); Skeel, Jr., supra note 198, at 2–3; Note, What We Talk About When We
Talk About Persons, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1750–54 (2001); see Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (recognizing that corporations have
certain constitutional rights vis-à-vis the state).
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encapsulated in the Bill of Rights, including Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights200 and First Amendment free speech rights.201
Even with its separate legal entity status, the question whether the
corporation holds rights under First Amendment Religion Clauses is
new.202 The modern for-profit corporation has typically been assumed to
be secular in nature, a place where religion is excluded, and both
corporate law and employment law emphasize a religiously neutral
workplace for employees.203 Historically, this was not always the case,
and significant historical work has been done that demonstrates the
interrelated nature of work, faith, and family prior to the Industrial
Revolution.204 That link was weakened with the advent of the Protestant
Revolution, which ripped apart the uniformity of religious belief, and the
ensuing Enlightenment era, which instigated the privatization of religion
more generally.205 The shift from an agrarian working life to urbanization
and industrialization served to increase the isolation of faith and work.206
200. See Santa Clara Co. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886).
201. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
202. Compare Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th
Cir. 2013) (holding that for-profit corporations may bring a First Amendment Religion
Clauses claim), with Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A] for-profit, secular corporation
cannot assert a claim under the Free Exercise Clause.”).
203. See Thomas D. Brierton, An Unjustified Hostility Toward Religion in the
Workplace, 34 Cath. Law. 289, 297 (1991); Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring
Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1392 (2009) (commenting that
executives are assumed to check morals and faith at the threshold and operate solely to
maximize the wealth of shareholders); Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 3, at
6; Francois Gaudu, Labor Law and Religion, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 507, 512–13
(2009); Lymon Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM & MARY BUS. L. REV.
75, 83 (2010) (citing HELEN J. ALFORD & MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, MANAGING AS IF FAITH
MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE MODERN ORGANIZATION 12 (2001))
(“Of course, deep-seated patterns of thought, ingrained business practices, and social
norms make it difficult to link the spheres of faith and business, leading to what Alford
and Naughton call ‘a divided life,’ where matters of Spirit and finance occupy wholly
separate spheres.”); Laura S. Underkuffler, ‘Discrimination’ on the Basis of Religion: An
Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV.
581, 588 (1989) (commenting that U.S. courts have assumed that “the implementation of
religious policies, practices, or values by the employer is inherently discriminatory”).
204. See, e.g., HERBERT APPLEBAUM, THE CONCEPT OF WORK 9 (1992); HAROLD
J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 322 (1983); MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 82–83,
86–87 (L.A. Manyon trans., 1961); EILEEN POWER, MEDIEVAL PEOPLE 3–7, 12, 14–15
(1927); Edward Shorter, The History of Work in the West: An Overview, in WORK AND
COMMUNITY IN THE WEST 1, 9 (Edward Shorter, ed. 1973); JAMES WESTFELL THOMPSON,
AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 648 (1928).
205. APPLEBAUM, supra note 204, at 584; BERMAN, supra note 204, at 57;
Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 3, at 9–10; Alain Supiot, Orare/Laborare,
30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 641, 643 (2009).
206. APPLEBAUM, supra note 204, at 584.
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With workers removed from their ancestral home and the land, work
became secularized to the “complete inversion of the everyday sense of
religion” that had formerly prevailed.207 One commentator notes that “in
industrialized cultures, the world of work is separated and divorced from
the home, family life, religious life, and other diverse activities of
citizens.”208 In America, with the increasing diversity of religious sects in
the face of high levels of religiously diverse immigrant populations, there
grew a consensus on the need for a religiously neutral workplace to avoid
divisive topics disrupting business operations.209 The common position
was that “religion and business simply don’t mix.”210
The religiously-neutral workplace received federal legal sanction
with the advent of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.211 As is
well-known, Title VII protects employees from discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion.212 Intra-corporate decisions
based on religion, then, are forbidden unless the employer is a “religious
corporation, association, or society” and the decision pertains to “work
connected with carrying by such corporation, association, or society of
its religious activities.”213 The scope of this exception was broadened in
1972 to exempt qualifying religious employers from Title VII’s
discrimination prohibitions with respect to all of its work, whether or not
it was part of the corporations’ religious activities or not.214
Consequently, unless the employer meets the strict qualifying standards
for classification as a religious employer, there is no scope for the
employer to “shape the character of its workforce via religiously
selective hiring practices.”215 In conjunction with Title VII’s
requirements that employers accommodate the religious observances of
207. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 3, at 10; Supiot, supra note
205, at 644, 646.
208. APPLEBAUM, supra note 204, at 9.
209. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 11–14 (2005); Colombo, Naked Private
Square, supra note 3, at 11.
210. DAVID W. MILLER, GOD AT WORK 3 (2007).
211. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2000e-17 (1964). Some states have passed more aggressive legislation. See,
e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Freedom Not to Listen: A Constitutional Analysis of Compulsory
Indoctrination Through Workplace Captive Audience Meetings, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 65, 115–16 (2010) (discussing legislation passed in New Jersey in 2006 and
Oregon in 2009).
212. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
213. Id.
214. Id.; see also Amos v. United States, 483 U.S. 327, 327 (1986).
215. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 3, at 14; see also Steven H.
Aden & Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Catch or Release? The Employment
Non-Discrimination Act’s Exemption For Religious Organizations, 11 ENGAGE J. 4, 4 n.4
(2010); Jon D. Michaels et al., Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of
Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 183, 218 (2002).
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their employees only when no more than a de minimis cost is imposed on
the employer, the Title VII prohibitions result in a workplace “scrubbed
of religious influence.”216 Some states have gone even further, making
proselytization in the workplace an intentional tort.217
In the face of this government-sanctioned, religiously neutral
workplace, America is witnessing the rise of the religiously expressive
corporation—a business organization that is driven simultaneously by the
desire to make a profit and religious values and concerns.218 A multitude
of factors have contributed to the rise of the religiously expressive
corporation, including a general revival of public faith amongst the
populous generally and the rise of the evangelical movement
specifically.219 Along with the ever-increasing importance of
corporations in the political sphere and, conversely, the unprecedented
importance of faith in the electoral process, a showing of faith on the part
of a for-profit corporation can be seen to be a savvy business decision as
well as a matter of religious devotion. Whatever the driving force behind
the renewal of the desire for faith in the workplace might be, religious
corporatism is increasing. With this comes more opportunity for clashing
between workplace religious faith and the regulatory state.220
The confluence of corporatism and religion raises heads on the
question of the role of the First Amendment Religion Clauses in
corporate America. A large number of for-profit corporations have filed
216. Colombo, Naked Private Square, supra note 3, at 14.
217. See Hartley, supra note 211, at 106; see also Julie Marie Baworowsky,
Note, From Public Square to Market Square: Theoretical Foundations of First and
Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Corporate Religious Speech, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1713, 1720–21 (2008) (commenting that under the Oregon and New Jersey
legislation it would be impermissible to post religious images in the workplace).
218. See RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION 64 (2014).
219. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, GOD IS BACK: HOW THE
GLOBAL REVIVAL OF FAITH IS CHANGING THE WORLD 12–15 (2009) (Religious and
spiritual materials that include new-age, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim publications were
the fastest growing segment in adult publishing for 1996 and 1997. Religious radio
stations have quadrupled over the past 25 years, while religious television shows
increased fourfold in the 1980s).
220. Recent examples of such clashes include: (1) Muslim taxi drivers in
Minneapolis refusing to transport passengers with seeing-eye dogs on the basis that
Muslims believe dogs are unclean, Michael Conlon, Minnesota Muslim Taxi Drivers
Could Face Crackdown, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2007), available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/idUSN1732288320070117; (2) male Muslim employees refusing to shake
hands with women based on the religious mandate against touching women, EEOC
Informal Discussion Letter, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 20,
2009),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2009/religionhandshakeletter.redacted%
20for%20posting.final.html; and (3) a butcher who worked at a Kosher butchery who did
not follow an Orthodox Jewish life, Maruani v. AER Servs., Inc., No. 06-176, 2006 WL
2666302, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Sept. 18, 2006).
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claims in federal district court claiming that the contraception mandate
violates the First Amendment rights of the corporation.221 The most
well-known of these for-profit challenges to the contraception mandate is
that of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., who, along with the Green family
(David, Barbara, Steve, and Mart Green, and Darsee Lett) own and
operate the Hobby Lobby, a privately held retail business with
headquarters in Oklahoma City.222
Hobby Lobby owns and operates over 500 stores nationally, with
over 13,000 full-time employees.223 The Green family also owns and
operates plaintiff Mardel, Inc., a bookstore and education company that
sells Christian-themed materials.224 Mardel, Inc., operates around 35
stores and has over 370 employees.225 Hobby Lobby and the Greens
claim that their Christian faith obligates them to operate their business in
accordance with their faith; “[c]ommitment to Jesus Christ and to
Biblical principles is what gives their business endeavors meaning and
purpose.”226 For the Greens, their faith translates into their business in
numerous ways, including employing fulltime chaplains to provide
spiritual support for their employees; monitoring all of their
merchandise, marketing, and operations to ensure they are consistent
with their faith (including closing on Sundays, even though this is
detrimental to profits); and donating company profits to fund
missionaries and ministries around the world.227 For the Greens, Mandel,
and Hobby Lobby, compliance with the Contraception Mandate would
mean violating their deeply held religious beliefs. Conversely,
non-compliance would result in millions of dollars in fines and penalties.

221. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356).
222. Id. at 1.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2.
227. Id. The company website specifies that Hobby Lobby is committed to
“honoring the Lord in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.” Our Company,
HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/our_company/our_company.cfm (last
visited Sept. 14, 2014). The corporation’s statement of purpose reads:
In order to effectively serve our owners, employees, and customers the Board
of Directors is committed to: Honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the
company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles. . . . Providing a
return on the owners’ investment, sharing the Lord’s blessings with our
employees, and investing in our community. We believe that it is by God’s
grace and provision that Hobby Lobby has endured. He has been faithful in
the past, we trust Him for our future.
Our Company: Statement of Purpose, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/
our_company/purpose.cfm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
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At the time of writing, many of the plaintiffs that had filed
complaints in federal court had moved the court for a preliminary
injunction.228 Of those, some have been granted pending a full hearing on
the merits,229 and some have been denied.230 What is apparent in all of
the opinions issued, either denying or granting the temporary relief, is
that the federal courts have no clear picture of how to classify these
for-profit plaintiffs. Whether the for-profit plaintiffs are a religious
institution for the purposes of the First Amendment Religion Clauses
religious institutions category, then, is a difficult and open question to
which the federal courts are grappling for guidance. The preliminary
framework aims to provide some guidance to the courts.
The framework presents a significant challenge for most for-profit
corporations. These challenges cut across all four of the guidelines for
identifying a constitutional religious institution.231 For-profit businesses
are, at their core, organized to buy and sell goods or services to strangers
meeting in the marketplace to compete with each other on the price or
quality of the purchases.232 Facially, for-profit corporations are rarely
recognized as a place where the goal of the organization is the meeting of
religious objectives; for-profit corporations do not function as a religious
institution, jurisgenerative233 to the end of facilitation of individual
conscience; rarely are for-profit corporations voluntary in the sense of
individuals electing to enter the business for religious purposes; and

228. See HHS Mandate Information Central, supra note 1 (detailing the
litigation actions taken by each of the complainants).
229. See, e.g., O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No.
12-3357, 2014 WL 4401187 (8th Cir. Sept. 8, 2014) (injunction granted pending appeal);
Newland v. Sebelius, 524 Fed. Appx. 706 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2902
(2014) (preliminary injunction granted); Korte v. Sebelius, 528 Fed. Appx. 583, 584 (7th
Cir. 2012) (injunction granted pending appeal); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 294, 400 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (denying request for injunctive
relief); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-5018, 2013 WL 2395168
(D.C. Cir. May 3, 2013) (preliminary injunction granted); Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F.
Supp. 2d 980, 984 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (preliminary injunction granted for Weingartz
plaintiffs); Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No.
12-3459-CV-S-RED, 2012 WL 6951316, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (preliminary
injunction granted).
230. See, e.g., Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying
request for injunction); Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 853–55 (7th Cir.
Jan. 30, 2013) (injunction granted pending appeal); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
2012 WL 6930302, at *2–3 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (denying request for injunctive
relief).
231. See supra notes 164–92 and accompanying text (outlining the framework
against which the for-profit corporation’s claim to be a religious institution is being
measured).
232. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971).
233. Cover, supra note 149, at 15.
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for-profit corporations do not seek privacy in the way we would expect
of a religious institution.
All of these factors can be condensed into two fundamental
objections to the recognition of for-profit corporations as a constitutional
religious institution: (1) they are governed and motivated primarily by
the profit-making function that is at the core of any commercial
enterprise and (2) the businesses are arranged around outsiders—
customers—whose brevity of entrance and exit into the institution
constrains the capacity of the business to foster individual religious belief
and generate community norms to facilitate expressions of faith.234
Taking the second point first, it is important to recognize that in a
competitive market, for-profit businesses are necessarily constrained
from encouraging their customers, and to some extent their employees, to
engage in faith-based activities when religiously motivated products are
not among those products or services that the entity is selling. Given the
ease of exit from commercial businesses, at least for the customer, there
is little to no incentive for the typical customer to linger and engage in
religious discourse, let alone religious worship and norm generating
activities. Indeed, in highly efficient and competitive markets, then, the
constraints of competition and consumer exit will ensure that businesses
will rarely challenge customers to remain within the institution for
reasons beyond the core transactional purpose.
Turning to the first point—that for-profit businesses are governed
and motivated by profit—it is important to recognize that, as buyers and
sellers of goods and services to strangers, commercial enterprises play a
crucial role in maintaining the social institution of the market.235
Attempting to usurp this role with a faith-motivated role has the potential
to undermine the institution of the market. Professor Roderick M. Hills
argues that while the value of efficient exchange is not challenged by
religiously motivated buyers and sellers utilizing the market to propagate
their faith-preferences, there is a “by market” that is jeopardized by
commercial enterprises “indulg[ing] their external preferences.”236
Writing in the context of freedom of expression, Hills claims that there is
a valuable tendency of markets to promote “douceur,” roughly
translating as something like “polish, urbanity, or polite gentleness.”237
This “douceur” by-market values the lessons of toleration of differences
234. Hills, Jr., supra note 124, at 215 (discussing the plausibility of categorizing
commercial enterprises as expressive associations).
235. Theda Skocpol, How Americans Became Civic, in CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 27, 65–70 (Theda Skocpol & Morris Fiorina eds. 1999); Albert
O. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or
Feeble?, 20 J. ECON LIT. 1463, 1467 (1982).
236. Hills, Jr., supra note 124, at 221.
237. Id.
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in social settings that buying and selling from strangers promotes—i.e., it
values social preconditions of market exchanges.
More than any other social setting, then, businesses are a place
where people who might otherwise have no contact with members of
different religions, races, or economic classes must mingle and
cooperate. If for-profit businesses lose focus on the core function of
profit-making, then there is a strong possibility that the inherent tendency
of markets to produce “douceur” will be diminished. As a matter of
structure and purpose, then, for-profit businesses not only fail to meet the
faith principle as a descriptive matter, but also as a normative one.
Further, the First Amendment valuing of religious institutions as
promoting individual conscience on matters of faith means that a core
attribute of the institution seeking First Amendment institutional status
must be that the institution generates norms for a definable collective
group in order to facilitate individual belief. In other words, to come
within the First Amendment’s protections, the group must somehow be
jurisgenerative, organized around a religious mission with a guiding
doctrine and goal to facilitate individual and collective religious belief.
While it seems clear that many of the owners of the for-profit
businesses that have filed challenges to the Contraception Mandate have
strong faith-based commitments, it is difficult to claim that these
businesses have any jurisgenerative role. It may be that the ethos of the
business is based on faith principles, but for-profit businesses, because of
their internal structures and social role, are ill-suited to the function of a
facilitator of collective belief. In other words, for-profit businesses do not
meet the faith-principle, not because they are not guided by faithful
persons, but because they should not be in the businesses of
faith-promotion at all. This sort of institution ought not to be
characterized as a constitutional religious institution; their raison d’être
is profit, not faith.
C. Religious Interest Groups
The third type of religious institution to challenge the Contraception
Mandate is the religious interest group. Groups like the Priests for Life,
organized specifically to lobby for legislative change in accordance with
a religious mission, claim that the Contraception Mandate would require
them to violate their religious conscience by providing contraception
coverage for their own employees.238 In addition, these religious interest
238. See, e.g., Dave Bohon, Pro-Life Group Announces It Will Defy
Contraception Mandate, PRIESTS FOR LIFE, http://www.priestsforlife.org/library/4887pro-life-group-announces-it-will-defy-contraception-mandate- (last visited Sept. 14,
2014). For a compilation of religious interest groups in the United States, see PAUL J.
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groups claim that providing contraception coverage would violate the
religious conscience of the donors that fund their operations, as well as
force them to act contrary to the very beliefs on which they were
founded.239
Generally speaking, the term “religious interest group” refers to a
membership organization that represents some interest that is based, at
least in part, on religion and attempts to influence, or urge the public to
influence, politics (i.e., lobby).240 In other words, a religious interest
group is a political interest group specifically established to operate in
the political sphere.241
While the number of religious interest groups in politics has
exploded in recent years, and the prominence of these groups in
American politics has likewise grown,242 interest groups have played a
central role in American politics since before the framing of the
Constitution.243 While there are divergent views on the normative value
of interest groups,244 all perspectives accept that interest groups zealously
WEBER & W. LANDIS JONES, U.S. RELIGIOUS INTEREST GROUPS xi–xiv (1994); Lobbying
for the Faithful, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (May 15, 2012)
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/11/21/lobbying-for-the-faithful-exec/.
239. See Two Aspects of Priests for Life, PRIESTS FOR LIFE,
http://www.priestsforlife.org/intro/introbrochure.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
240. DANIEL HOFRENNING, IN WASHINGTON BUT NOT OF IT: THE PROPHETIC
POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS LOBBYISTS 21 (1995) (also referred to as parachurches, organized
interests, factions, pressure groups, and special interests).
241. See Zoë Robinson, Lobbying in the Shadows: Religious Interest Groups in
the Legislative Process, 64 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (describing religious interest
groups and discussing their normative voracity in politics).
242. See Lobbying for the Faithful, supra note 238 (tracing the history of
religious interest groups and stating that the number of religious advocacy groups
exceeds 212).
243. ANTHONY J. NOWNES, TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT AND HOW
THEY TRY TO GET IT 16 (2006).
244. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 21,
28–29 (1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN
AMERICAN CITY 89, 91–92 (1961); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW &
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 33–37 (1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 (1988); William C. Mitchell & Michael C.
Munger, Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 512, 514–15 (1991); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 48–49 (1985); see also LEE EPSTEIN & C.K. ROWLAND, Introduction, in
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 4–5 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 8th ed.)
(arguing that government-sponsored interest group pluralism and the stability it provides
comes at the expense of genuine flexibility, democratic forms, and, ultimately,
legitimacy); CAROLE S. GREENWALD, GROUP POWER: LOBBYING AND PUBLIC POLICY 305
(1977) (claiming that interests are represented unequally and unfairly, with the groups
with the greatest resources dominating societal policies); Theodore J. Lowi, Foreward:
New Dimensions in Policy and Politics, in MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN
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lobby for whatever policies will best advance the interests of that
particular group.245 Each and every group will act to further their
particular group’s mission, maximizing their own interests at the expense
of others. Under any view, interest groups will seek to maximize their
influence on government in order to be able to demand the regulator
results that most benefit their interests.
Similarly, religious interest groups are formed to lobby for the best
outcomes for the interests they represent. Religious interest groups
typically present in two forms, with the distinction being the principal
whose interest the religious interest group represents in the political
sphere. In its first form, the religious interest group is a representative of
a specific religious denomination or church.246 These religious interest
groups are interest groups that are empowered to represent particular
religious traditions and/or specific congregations, for example the United
State Conference of Catholic Bishops or the American Baptist Church
USA.247 While these denominationally specific interest groups are
certainly formal outposts or extensions of various formal church groups,
they are by definition separable from them.248 In its second form, the
religious interest group does not exist as a representative of a particular
denominational organization or church. Instead, in this second form, the
religious interest group represents a collective of individuals whose
views derive from and depend on a religious perspective, for example
Priests for Life, the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, or
the National Right to Life Committee.249 Religious interest groups, then,
act as an intermediaries between either the leadership group of a specific
denomination or a specific church and the state, or as a collection of
individuals whose policy goals are based on religious principles.
Priests for Life, one of the challengers to the Contraception
Mandate, is a prime example of a religious interest group. Priests for Life
was founded in 1991 with the objective of “help[ing] priests around the

POLITICS: CASES IN SOCIAL REGULATORY POLICY xvi (Raymond Tatalovich & Byron W.
Daynes eds., 1998); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 519 (2d ed. 1971).
245. Matthew Stephenson & Howell E. Jackson, Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents:
Implications for Public Policy in a Pluralist System, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2010).
246. See Robinson, supra note 241, at 14–15.
247. See, e.g., About USCCB, U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
http://www.usccb.org/about/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 2014); AM. BAPTIST
CHURCHES USA, http://www.abc-usa.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
248. See ALLEN HERTZKE, THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: GLOBAL
CHALLENGES 80–81 (2012); HOFRENNING, supra note 240, at 21; ROBERT ZWIER, BORN
AGAIN POLITICS: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN AMERICA 99 (1982).
249. NAT’L COALITION TO ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY, http://www.ncadp.org (last
visited Sept. 1, 2014); NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org (last visited Sept. 1,
2014).
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world spread the Gospel of Life to their people.”250 Relevantly, the
Priests for Life specify that its mission is to help clergy “take a more
vocal and active role in the pro-life movement, with the predominant
emphasis on the issues of abortion and euthanasia.”251 As a religious
interest group, then, Priests for Life “exists in order to show the clergy
how to fight the culture of death.”252
The relevant question is, of course: are the Priests for Life and other
religious interest groups “religious institutions” under the Religion
Clauses? Are the activities of these groups absolutely protected and
therefore outside the scope of even the most stringent of lobbying
regulations? To answer these questions, we again turn to the guidelines
contained in the framework, and these guidelines suggest that the answer
is no, religious interest groups are not First Amendment religious
institutions.
While it seems that at least the first three factors from the
framework could plausibly be claimed to have been met—recognition as
a religious institution, functions as a religious institution, and
voluntariness253—the privacy guideline proves a difficult roadblock for
recognizing religious interest groups as constitutional religious
institutions.254
There are, of course, many reasons why religious groups are
politically active. The core reason for most churches and religious
individuals is that they feel a responsibility to influence politics with
their morals and values, be it to change the status quo, or protect their
own interests. In other words, these groups are established in order to
engage with the state, not to seek privacy from the state. For example,
the head of one prominent religious interest group has said that “the
Christian faith and moral teachings have implications for politics.
Churches should be active in bringing those values to bear in political
life.”255
For many church groups and related or affiliated advocacy groups,
bringing their religious values to the political forum is a (the) way of

250. Complaint, Priests for Life, supra note 71, at 12.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 144–53 and accompanying text (discussing the framework
of these three factors).
254. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the framework’s
privacy factor).
255. Erik J. Ablin, The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on
Church Participation in Political Campaigns, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
541, 573 (1999); see also Dean M. Kelley, The Rationale for the Involvement of Religion
in the Body Politic, in THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 159, 183
(James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1991).
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ensuring that society is just, and that members of society are guided “in
distinguishing right from wrong, whether practical in, or out of
government.”256 A related justification is that religious advocacy groups
see themselves as a check on governmental power, an intermediary
institution that moderates between government and citizen, providing a
moral check against government power as a surrogate for the individual.
In this way, religious groups see themselves as a “uniquely qualified
moral critic to the policies of government.”257
This is certainly the case for Priests for Life, whose website notes:
Elections have consequences, and the consequences for
the unborn—and for the battle to protect them—are particularly
significant. The options that the pro-life movement has in the
legislative, legal, and political arenas, and the probability of
success for various initiatives, change as a result of the
elections.
Our movement, at the same time, does not look to elected
officials to do our work for us. The work of advancing the
pro-life agenda remains our work. Elected officials either make
that work easier or harder. But either way, this is a movement.
Regardless of the outcome of any local, state, or national
election, together we must be proactive—not reactive—and
make aggressive plans to ensure that the pro-life cause is
moving forward, continually growing in size and
effectiveness.258
Religious lobbyists, like Priests for Life, tend to be animated by the
view that the regulation, legislation, or policy against which they are
acting is fundamentally incorrect, and that incremental change through
compromise after compromise is unacceptable.259 Ultimately, then,
religious lobbyists seek radical—or fundamental—change in public
policy, something that most, if not all, classic lobbyists do not work
toward.260 When religious interest groups agitate for a particular policy
outcome, the process becomes winner takes all. As leading political
scientist Daniel Hofrenning notes, “[r]eligious lobbyists seek to
fundamentally transform the political and social reality of America.

256. Ablin, supra note 255, at 574.
257. Id.
258. Priests
for
Life
Online
Pole,
PRIESTS
http://www.priestsforlife.org/news/poll.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2014).
259. HOFRENNING, supra note 240, at 52–53.
260. Id.
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These sweeping goals are rooted in a religious understanding of the
achievement of the kingdom of God on earth.”261
By definition, then, religious interest groups do not seek to protect
the state from religious involvement, as the privacy-seeking factor
suggests is necessary. Instead, religious interest groups are designed to
engage and entangle with the state in order to influence governmental
institutions and direct policy outcomes. Religious interest groups cannot
be considered constitutional religious institutions, and they fail to attract
the categorical First Amendment protections of Hosanna-Tabor.
CONCLUSION
With the advent of the Contraception Mandate litigation, we have
seen the potential scope of institutions that are claiming to be a
constitutional
religious
institution. This
newly recognized
right—constitutional religious institutionalism—is immensely powerful,
according these institutions absolute constitutional protection to conduct
their affairs as they choose. In the context of the Contraception Mandate,
the rights holder would be entitled to deny coverage for contraception
without any governmental oversight or regulation.262 That is, the new
First Amendment religious institutions category recognizes an absolute
right of private ordering for those institutions that validly claim to fall
within the auspices of its protection. Yet, this new right does not make
all institutions with some religious basis “constitutional religious
institutions.” However, the Supreme Court has yet to provide any
guidance on how to disaggregate those institutions that are constitutional
religious institutions and those that are not.
This Article has argued that we need to embrace institutional
exceptionalism, and, to that end, has outlined a framework for
identifying those institutions that have as their purpose protection of core
constitutional values. Applying this framework to the various classes of
litigants in the Contraception Mandate challenges, this Article shows that
it is possible to identify these special institutions with sufficient (albeit
not perfect) specificity. Examining the new religious institutionalism
through the lens of the Contraception Mandate demonstrates the critical
importance of answering the threshold question of who or what is a
constitutional religious institution. Extending the new religious
institutionalism to all of the classes of Mandate litigants would result in a
constitutional arrangement that is antithetical to the purposes of the
Religion Clauses and religious freedom more generally.
261. Id. at 107.
262. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (discussing RFRA’s impact
on the Contraception Mandate).
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At times it might seem that all institutions can, in some way, be
considered “religious institutions.” But they are not, and we should
embrace this distinction. Ultimately, everyone benefits by properly
protecting those few institutions that truly fulfill a unique and
constitutionally recognizable role.

